Attitudes on Residential Integration: Perceived Status Differences, Mere In-Group Preference, or Racial Prejudice?*

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Abstract

Residential segregation, especially of blacks from whites, remains the common pattern in urban America. This research examines the part that popular attitudes on residential integration may play in the process of residential integration/segregation. Using data from a large multiethnic sample survey in Los Angeles, we examine three hypotheses about the nature of attitudes toward residential integration. The perceived economic status difference hypothesis holds that attitudes about racial residential integration rest upon assumptions about likely class background differences between ethnic groups. The mere in-group preference hypothesis suggests that ethnocentrism results in mutual across-group preferences for residential contact with in-group members. The prejudice hypothesis suggests that hostile attitudes toward an out-group shape views on residential integration. Little evidence in support of the perceived economic status difference and mere in-group preference hypotheses can be found. Theories of prejudice, in particular Blumer's theory of group position, provide much greater leverage on residential integration attitudes. We discuss the implications of the results for actual behavior and aggregate patterns of racial residential segregation.

Racial residential segregation is arguably the "structural linchpin" of American race relations (Bobo 1989; Pettigrew 1979). Analyses of 1980 census data showed that in 16 large metropolitan areas — including Los Angeles — blacks were "hypersegregated" from whites, exhibiting extreme isolation across at least four of five standard indicators (Massey & Denton 1989). Although some modest improvement occurred between 1980 and 1990, blacks remain highly segregated from whites and substantially more isolated from whites than either Asians or Hispanics (Farley & Frey 1994).

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There are strong reasons to believe that interethnic attitudes play a part in the problem of residential segregation. In particular, the distinctly high rates of black-white segregation would appear to call for attention to potential structures of racial attitude and preference in the population. As Massey and Denton (1989:389) argued: "Blacks are thus unique in experiencing multidimensional hypersegregation. The contrast between them and Hispanics is not easily explained by different socioeconomic characteristics, varying population sizes, different regional locations, or contrasting metropolitan conditions. Although our models cannot eliminate the view that some unmeasured objective factor accounts for the discrepancy between blacks and Hispanics, the models lend credence to the view that blacks remain the object of significantly higher levels of Anglo prejudice than Hispanics." Indeed, the degree of black residential isolation is so unique and persistent that it prompted Massey and Denton (1993) to label the phenomenon "American Apartheid," concluding that racial residential segregation is central to the development and persistence of an urban underclass that is disproportionately African American.

Others have challenged the view that uniquely potent levels of antiblack prejudice and discrimination contribute to the higher levels of black segregation from whites. For example, a number of econometric analyses emphasize such factors as economic status differences, job location, and other differences in tastes as contributing to racial residential segregation (Berry 1979; Leven et al. 1976). A central factor may be mutual patterns of in-group preference as opposed to out-group avoidance or hostility. Clark (1986, 1992) argued that the degree of joint preference among whites and blacks for living near substantial concentrations of coracial/coethnic group members is probably a larger factor in explaining modern residential segregation than white avoidance and discrimination.

Our broad objective in this research is to understand the climate of attitudes, beliefs, and opinions about racial residential segregation. We bring three objectives to the research. First, we wish to characterize the current levels of expressed preference for social distance from members of different racial and ethnic group backgrounds. Such preferences have implications for likely patterns of individual and institutional discrimination in the housing market. Second, we specifically test social psychological aspects of the perceived social class differences, the mere in-group preferences, and the prejudice models as they might influence patterns of residential segregation. Third, in recognition of the increasing diversity of many major metropolitan areas, our research is multiethnic in scope, examining the attitudes of blacks, whites, Hispanics, and Asians.[1] One possibility is that increasing ethnic diversity creates a "buffer," opening to blacks more opportunity for residential mobility and contact with whites.

Views on Racial Residential Segregation

Many factors may contribute to and constrain an individual's choice of housing location: cost and affordability, location, the quality of housing stock, proximity to work, stage in the life cycle, quality of schools, and so on (Galster 1988).

Aggregate patterns of segregation by racial/ethnic group membership can thus stem from any of several individual-level processes. With respect to understanding patterns of specifically racial residential preferences, three hypotheses are typically considered. These hypotheses are, first, that perceived differences in socioeconomic status that heavily coincide with racial/ethnic boundaries contribute to racial residential preferences; second, that members of all social groups tend to be ethnocentric, expressing preference for association and interaction with fellow racial/ethnic group members; and third, that more active out-group avoidance or domination are at the root of racial residential preferences. We elaborate on each of these models below.

THE PERCEIVED SOCIAL CLASS DIFFERENCE HYPOTHESIS

According to this view, racially/ethnically segregated neighborhoods are the result of perceived group differences in socioeconomic status characteristics: income, occupation, and associated differences in life-style (see Jackman & Jackman 1983 on class identities as involving life-style considerations). These perceived status differences are influential both within and across groups such that, "except for the genuinely poor, all people — white and black, rich and not so rich, are willing to pay, and substantially, to avoid class integration. . . . Rising above humble origins to make it in the new and better neighborhood is central to our societal tradition. Without passing judgment on it we must acknowledge the tradition, and we certainly do not seek policies to destroy it" (Leven et al. 1976:202-3). Clark (1988) draws attention to a number of social class characteristics that would increase opposition to having blacks as neighbors. He argues that, in addition to differences in wealth, black households are more likely to have a female head, unemployed adults, and more residents per household. These characteristics leave black home seekers at a disadvantage, not because of their race, but because of class-based differences in the potential for wear and tear to property, lower incomes, and unstable employment patterns.

Thus, under this model, minority group members — particularly blacks — are said to live in segregated areas because they are perceived as lacking the material and cultural-class-based resources needed to obtain housing in more desirable, predominantly white suburban areas. Under this hypothesis, we should find that the more individuals perceive that members of an out-group lag behind his or her own racial/ethnic group socioeconomically, the greater the objection to substantial residential contact with that group.

Despite the commonsense appeal and plausibility of this hypothesis, there is little evidence supporting it. Galster's (1988) comprehensive review concluded that affordability and other race-neutral economic factors (e.g., job location) accounted for at best a small fraction of black-white residential segregation. The bulk of evidence supporting this perspective comes from survey questions in which respondents are asked to explain why groups — usually blacks and whites — tend to live in separate neighborhoods, and/or the extent to which groups are perceived as having the ability to pay for housing in particular areas (Farley et al. 1993; Farley et al. 1978). Black-white comparisons of actual housing expenditures indicate a great deal of overlap, suggesting that many blacks can, indeed, afford to live in "desirable" neighborhoods (Farley et al. 1993).[2]

Likewise, inaccurate knowledge of the cost of housing cannot account for black-white levels of segregation. In 1976, blacks and whites in the Detroit area possessed accurate knowledge of housing prices in the greater Detroit area; by 1992, both blacks and whites tended to overestimate the cost of suburban housing (Farley et al. 1993:11-12). Despite this change, blacks and whites reported extensive and accurate knowledge of blacks' financial capabilities, with both groups recognizing that significant numbers of blacks can, indeed, afford to live in suburban areas (14).

THE MERE IN-GROUP PREFERENCE HYPOTHESIS

Contrary to analyses of residential segregation that give center stage to "white avoidance" or to institutional discrimination (Pearce 1979; Yinger 1986), Clark (1992) asserts the primary importance of in-group preferences. By in-group preferences he refers to "strong desires for own-race combinations in the ethnicity of neighborhoods" (451). These preferences are interpreted as a simple and natural ethnocentrism rather than anti-out-group sentiment or an effort to preserve relative status advantages. Clark argues that there are "strong similarities in own-race preferences among different ethnic groups" (463-64), and that "discrimination in the housing market plays only a minor role" (452). The preferred racial/ethnic composition of a neighborhood is simply one of many characteristics taken into consideration when searching for housing. What is more, under this model, preferences themselves are driven by positive feelings about one's own group, not negative feelings about out-groups. These ethnocentric feelings act in concert with group differences in economic status to explain the bulk of residential segregation: segregation results from the mutually ethnocentric social preferences of consumers (Clark 1986:108-9).[3] Under this hypothesis, strong feelings of in-group attachment or affect should increase objections to substantial residential integration with members of other groups.

Two immediate problems arise with the in-group preference hypothesis. While many individuals may attribute segregation to mutual ethnocentrism, such an account may function as a convenient mask or excuse for those who do not wish to express out-group prejudices more directly. Farley et al. (1994) asked respondents to the 1992 Detroit Area Study to explain why blacks and whites generally lived in different neighborhoods. Variants of the "mere in-group preference" argument were the most common answer, with 30% of whites opining that "birds of a feather flock together" or that "people just prefer it that way." Detailed analysis, however, shows that large fractions of white DAS respondents expressed negative stereotypes of blacks. They were especially inclined to do so when asked why they would not live in neighborhoods with large numbers of blacks.

In addition, emphasizing in-group preferences — positive in-group affect or ethnocentrism — as opposed to prejudice to explain persisting racial residential segregation minimizes the extent to which the preferences of one group constrain the preferences of other groups, particularly blacks. If more than token numbers of black neighbors are "seen as threatening to white households" (Clark 1991:3), and this threat results in avoidance behavior or "white flight," this would seem to indicate the presence of something more closely resembling

negative out-group affect. If preferences for same-race neighborhoods were equal across groups, and were accompanied by assurances of equal quality of life across groups, it might be persuasive to view in-group preferences as neutral. However, because of the manifestly racist historical origins of residential segregation in the U.S. (Cell 1981; Jaynes & Williams 1989; Woodward 1974) and because its effects are not neutral in their consequences (Massey & Denton 1993), it seems shortsighted to consider them neutral.

THE PREJUDICE HYPOTHESIS

Two variants of the prejudice hypothesis are relevant to attitudes toward residential integration. The first is closer to *traditional prejudice* and, in contrast to the mere in-group preference hypothesis, stresses the importance of out-group hostility in determining individual attitudes about residential contact (Allport 1954; Katz 1991; Pettigrew 1982). Prejudice is typically defined as an irrational antipathy against minority groups and their members. Prejudice is understood as heavily imbued with negative affect and negative stereotypes that make the views of the prejudiced individual unreceptive to reason and new information (Jackman 1994). Accordingly, under the traditional prejudice hypothesis we should find that measures of negative affective response to out-group members and of negative stereotypes should be the most strongly associated with objections to residential integration.

A second variant of the prejudice hypothesis is rooted in Blumer's (1958) theory of race prejudice as *a sense of group position.* Rather than placing negative feelings and beliefs at the core of prejudice, Blumer argued that prejudice involves a commitment to a specific group status or *relative* group position. The group position hypothesis suggests that neither mere in-group preference nor out-group hostility are sufficient to give prejudice social force. Instead, what matters is the magnitude or degree of difference that in-group members have socially learned to expect and maintain relative to members of specific out-groups. As a result, under the sense of group position hypothesis, it is the degree of difference between in-group attachment and out-group hostility that should be most strongly associated with objections to residential integration (see Bobo 1988). The greater the affective differentiation from members of an out-group, with such differentiation understood as one indicator of a preferred superior group position, the greater the likelihood of objections to residential integration.

Both the traditional prejudice hypothesis and group position as prejudice hypothesis view residential segregation as connected to attitudes about an out-group. As such, racial residential segregation persists because "whites prefer and are willing to pay more for segregation than blacks are willing [or able] to pay for integration" (Muth 1986:9). Several types of research on attitudinal data point to the plausibility of the prejudice hypothesis. To be sure, there has been a sweeping rise in whites' advocacy of the *principle* of free residential choice for blacks. Trend studies have shown, however, that whites still express great opposition to the enforcement of blacks' right to live wherever they can afford (Bobo, Schuman & Steeh 1986; Pettigrew 1973, 1979; Schuman, Steeh & Bobo 1985). Experimental data have also shown many whites to express greater

residential social distance from blacks than from Asians (Schuman & Bobo 1988).

Data and Measures

The data for testing these several views of residential integration attitudes come from the 1992 Los Angeles County Social Survey (Institute for Social Science Research 1992; hereafter LACSS). The LACSS is a countywide telephone survey of adults living in households selected by random dialing of digits. In addition to the general countywide sample, oversamples of telephone numbers in ZIP code areas of high black concentration (65% or more) and of high Asian concentration (30% or more) were used to efficiently generate larger numbers of black and Asian respondents. To fully capture the views and opinions of Los Angeles's very large Latino population, a Spanish language translation of the questionnaire was developed. Monolingual Spanish speakers and those preferring to conduct the interview in Spanish were interviewed in Spanish.

There were a total of 1,869 respondents, with 625 white, 483 black, 477 Latino, and 284 Asian respondents. The split-ballot design for some measures resulted in fewer cases for portions of the analysis.

Interviews were conducted by trained student interviewers taking part in a survey research methods course and by the regular interviewing staff of the Survey Research Center. The student interviewers received 12 hours of training. The LACSS procedure is to attempt a telephone number 12 times, systematically varying the day of the week and time of day before dropping it from the sample. The questionnaire averaged 38 minutes in length. The study had an overall cooperation rate of 55%. Within each major racial/ethnic group the distribution of sample characteristics on key social background factors closely resemble data from the 1990 census (see Bobo et al. 1992).[4] A systematic analysis of potential nonresponse bias, based on the procedure recommended by O'Neil (1979), indicated no pattern of significant nonresponse bias (Greenwell, Strohm & Bobo 1994).

Results

RESIDENTIAL INTEGRATION ATTITUDES

In order to tap views on racial residential integration, the 1992 LACSS included a series of questions that asked each respondent whether he or she would strongly favor, favor, neither favor nor oppose, oppose, or strongly oppose living in a neighborhood where half of their neighbors would be (in the case of white respondents) blacks, or Latinos, or Asians. Members of each major racial/ethnic category were asked about each potential out-group. In the current research, we choose to ask about a neighborhood composed of "half" members of another racial/ethnic group in order to effectively pose the issue of the importance of race/ethnic makeup to the respondent. Mentioning a half other race/ethnicity neighborhood immediately suggests substantial integration but does not go the further step of putting the respondent in a minority status,

which would raise an additional conceptual issue. The distribution of responses, combining "oppose" and "strongly oppose" responses, are shown by race/ethnicity of respondent and by target group in Table 1.

We should first note that, in an absolute sense, at least compared to actual levels of racial residential segregation, these numbers suggest substantial openness to residential integration in the mass public. For example, as Table 1 shows, just 34% of whites said that they were opposed or strongly opposed to living in a neighborhood where *half* of their neighbors would be black. Another 46% offered neutral opinions, and 1 in 5 said they would favor or strongly favor living in such a highly integrated area. To a degree, this may reflect a bias of socially desirable responses, with many respondents, whites in particular, unwilling to voice objections to residential contact with minorities. Yet we do not believe the pattern reflects a serious response bias of this kind, nor does it constitute a sharp disjuncture with actual patterns of racial residential segregation. Respondents did not give unreflective pro-integration responses. First, and most important, it is immediately apparent that members of each group react differently to each minority group. The rate of whites' objections to residential integration with Asians, for instance, is 12% lower than that observed when asked about blacks. Similarly, the rate of Asian objections to residential contact with blacks is nearly twice as high as that for potential contact with Hispanics and about six times as high as that for potential contact with whites. Second, awareness of the general perception of blacks as the least desirable neighbors, a perception reflected in these results, may be more consequential for individual housing choices and location than a deeply held personal aversion. Blacks may be discouraged by the unpredictable reaction from a relatively small number of not easily identified, potentially hostile whites from moving into predominantly white neighborhoods. At minimum, in rank order of groups, the attitudinal data closely mirror the findings from more objective measures.

Several other patterns emerge. Only a trivial percentage of blacks, Hispanics, and Asians express objection to living in a largely white neighborhood. The figure is below 10% for each of the minority groups. This is consistent with the assumption that greater residential contact with whites is typically seen as being associated with upward social mobility and access to better neighborhoods and services.

Blacks are clearly the least preferred potential neighbors. The highest rates of objection to interracial residential settings occurs when blacks are the target group of potential contact. Fully 46% of Asians object to living in a half black neighborhood and a least a third of both whites and Hispanics express similar objections. If viewed as a rank order of preferences in the population as a whole, then, blacks are unequivocally at the bottom of the preference hierarchy and whites just as unequivocally are at the top.

Black respondents are the least likely to object to residential integration. White respondents are the most likely to object to interracial residential contact, with but one exception (i.e., Asians are more strongly opposed to contact with blacks). All in all, these patterns strongly suggest the presence of a well-defined racial rank order with respect to housing. In this racial order, blacks are the bottom group, at once most open to integrated living with members of other groups and yet confronting the most resistance from other groups.

TABLE 1: Race and Residential Integration Attitudes Objections to Residential Integration with Out-Groups, by Race/Ethnicity

	Respondent Race			
Target group	Whites	Blacks	Hispanics	Asians
Whites	—	8.3%	8.6%	6.1%
	—	(481)	(476)	(281)
$\chi^2 = 16.62$ df = 8 $p < .05$				
Blacks	34.3	—	32.8	46.2
	(613)	—	(473)	(277)
$\chi^2 = 32.83$ df = 8 $p < .0001$				
Hispanics	25.6	21.4	—	24.9
	(619)	(221)	—	(278)
$\chi^2 = 69.63$ df = 8 $p < .0001$				
Asians	22.7	19.2	20.6	—
	(618)	(478)	(472)	—
$\chi^2 = 47.00$ df = 8 $p < .0001$				

In order to understand the social bases of these attitudes, we examined the percentage objecting to residential integration by race of respondent, race of target group of the question, and several major social background variables (respondent age, education, occupation, sex, family income, and nativity). In general, these results suggest infrequent and small effects of these background factors on residential integration attitudes. Out of 72 tests, only 21 attain conventional criteria of significance.[5]

Nonetheless, several of these patterns are worthy of note. First, among white respondents, the data consistently show that the lower the level of education, the higher the likelihood of objecting to residential integration. Second, there is a slight tendency for younger white and black respondents to express greater opposition to contact with Hispanics and Asians than do their older coethnics. Third, nativity sometimes influences the residential segregation views of Hispanics and Asians, though in opposite directions. Foreign-born

Asians are highly likely to object to residential integration with blacks. Native-born Latinos are more likely to object to residential integration with blacks and whites than are foreign-born Latinos.

IN-GROUP PREFERENCE HYPOTHESIS

Our primary analytical task in the remainder of this article is to understand the possible sources of individuals' racial residential integration attitudes. Clark (1986, 1992) argued that in-group preference was a substantial factor in racial residential preferences. We measured in-group attachment with a widely used procedure known as a feeling thermometer. Respondents were asked to rate each of several social groups on a scale running from 0 degrees, which represented extremely cold feelings, to 100 degrees, which represented extremely warm feelings, and where 50 represented neutral feelings. This approach to tapping affective reactions to issues, candidates, and social groups has been widely used in the literature on intergroup attitudes within sociology (Bobo 1988; Jackman 1977; Jackman & Muha 1984; Schuman, Steeh & Bobo 1985), and political psychology (Sears 1988). We asked respondents to rate their own group, and each of the other major racial/ethnic groups on the thermometer scales. The mean scores by race are shown in Table 2.

Consistent with Clark's "mere in-group preference" hypothesis, all groups express in-group preferences. That is, the in-group thermometer rating is on average the highest absolute rating given by members of each group (highest scores run along the diagonal). Furthermore, by a slight margin blacks have the highest in-group affective rating — 71.2 — followed by Hispanics at 68.3, then whites at 66.3 and Asians at 65.0. A pattern worthy of note is that minorities consistently give whites higher affective ratings than they do to other out-groups. In other words, the highest average out-group rating among minorities comes in reaction to whites, not in reaction to members of another minority group. This pattern again points to the presence of an American racial rank order, with whites *consensually* regarded as occupying the most preferred social position.

These thermometer measures allow us to test aspects of the mere in-group preference hypothesis. Table 3 shows the Pearson correlation coefficient for the in-group thermometer rating and each of the racial residential integration questions by respondent race/ethnicity. As is immediately evident, in-group affect has a uniformly weak relation to racial residential integration attitudes. In only one instance does the correlation rise above .10 (blacks' reactions to Hispanics, $r = -.13$), and in this case the effect is in the wrong direction, suggesting that as positive in-group feeling increases among blacks, opposition to residential integration with Hispanics tends to decrease. This first-cut analysis suggests that mere in-group preference is not likely to be a substantial determinant of whites' reactions to racial residential integration or to the reactions of blacks, Hispanics, or Asians either.

TABLE 2: Race and Mean Feeling Thermometer Ratings Thermometer Scales[a]

	Respondent Race				
	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	f
Group rated					
Whites	66.3	61.4	62.8	62.1	6.03***
Blacks	58.4	71.2	55.4	53.1	59.50***
Hispanics	58.8	58.9	68.3	53.7	32.50***
Asians	58.8	55.2	55.5	65.0	14.96***

[a] Scores are means on a 0 to 100 scale where high scores indicate warmer or more positive feelings.

*** $p < .001$

IS IT PREJUDICE?

The thermometer ratings also allow us to test aspects of the two prejudice-based hypotheses about attitudes on racial residential segregation. It is possible that affective hostility to an out-group is a more substantial element of racial residential preferences than mere in-group preference. To examine this possibility, the second row of figures in each target-group block of Table 3 reports the correlation between racial residential integration attitudes and the appropriate out-group thermometer rating. Among all groups, the out-group affective rating is more strongly correlated with residential integration attitudes than mere in-group preference. The general pattern is that as the out-group affective rating improves, opposition to interracial residential contact with members of that group tends to decline.

We can also test aspects of the group position model of prejudice as a basis of racial residential integration attitudes. Under this model, it is ideas and beliefs about the relative group positions that constitute the psychological core of prejudice, not merely in-group attachment or out-group aversion. We attempt to capture such positional commitments with a difference score that involves subtracting an individual respondent's rating of each out-group from his or her in-group rating using the thermometers. We refer to this measure as a difference score or affective differentiation measure. The third row of each target-group block of figures shows the correlation between the affective differentiation measure and the racial residential integration attitudes measure.

The affective difference measure is the strongest correlate of racial residential integration attitudes among whites. In each case, for white respondents the correlation exceeds .3, and it reaches .43 in the case of reactions to living in a half Asian neighborhood. In short, as the affective difference that whites prefer to maintain between themselves and members of minority groups rises, so does the level of opposition to racial residential integration. Consistent with the group position model then, there appears to be something status-oriented

TABLE 3: Correlation of In-Group Affect, Out-Group Affect, and Affective Differentiation with Residential Integration Attitudes[a]

		Respondent Race			
Target group		Whites	Blacks	Hispanics	Asians
Whites	In-group	—	-.03	-.04	-.01
	Out-group	—	-.25***	-.16***	-.19**
	Difference	—	.18***	.11*	.18**
Blacks	In-group	.09*	—	-.08	-.02
	Out-group	-.25***	—	-.17***	-.28***
	Difference	.37***	—	.09	.25***
Hispanics	In-group	.04	-.13**	—	-.07
	Out-group	-.26***	-.30***	—	-.27***
	Difference	.32***	.17***	—	.20***
Asians	In-group	.10*	-.04	-.05	—
	Out-group	-.32***	-.36***	-.18***	—
	Difference	.43***	.30***	.11*	—

[a] Figures are Pearson's correlation coefficients.

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

and positional underlying whites' reactions to the possibility of substantial racial residential integration, not simply in-group preference or out-group aversion.

The affective differentiation measures, although consistently stronger correlates of residential integration attitudes than mere in-group preference, usually exhibit weaker correlations than simple out-group ratings among minority respondents. For blacks, Hispanics, and Asians the correlation between the affective differentiation measure and residential integration attitudes is always weaker, and sometimes substantially so (e.g., .17 versus -.30 for blacks' reactions to Hispanics), than the correlation with the out-group affective rating alone. This immediately implies that status and positional issues have less to do with how minority respondents form their attitudes on residential integration than is apparently true of whites.

We wished to gain greater leverage on racial prejudice as a possible source of attitudes on residential integration. To do so, we also examined how measures of racial stereotypes relate to the racial residential integration attitudes.[6] Table 4 shows, by race/ethnicity of respondent and of the target group of the question, mean scores on a series of bipolar trait rating scales. Each item and the overall scales range from 1 to 7, with a score of 4 as a neutral or

mid point. Each item has been scored so that higher scores reflect more negative ratings on the dimensions of intelligence, welfare dependency, and difficulty to get along with socially. Time constraints made it impossible to ask about a much wider set of traits, but these three were chosen on substantive grounds. Intelligence is a classic issue in intergroup relations. In an achievement-oriented society such as the U.S., intelligence is often credited with explaining socioeconomic success or failure and a host of other social and behavioral outcomes, such as involvement in crime. Welfare dependency has been a longstanding aspect of antiblack stereotypes in the U.S. and may be increasing as an aspect of stereotypes of Latinos as well. The "hard to get along with" dimension was included because of the widespread discussion that many recent Asian immigrant groups, especially but not exclusively Koreans, have brought cultural styles of interaction that are more brusque than is typical of U.S. culture. Hence, we expect that this set of traits taps critical dimensions of minority group stereotypes that are likely to have bearing on willingness to share residential space with minority group members.

The rows of Table 4 within each target-group block report the mean rating on each of three trait dimensions, and the fourth row reports an average stereotype score based on all three traits. The figures in parentheses report the Pearson correlation for each trait measure and the stereotype indexes with the racial residential integration attitudes. Among whites in particular, the results suggest that negative stereotypes are an element of how individuals form their attitudes to racial residential integration.

Consider first just the stereotypes themselves. Blacks receive the most negative overall ratings and whites, predictably, receive the most favorable overall ratings. Asians and Hispanics tend to fall in between these extremes, with ratings of Hispanics quite close to those found for blacks and ratings of Asians quite close to those found for whites. Among white, Asian, and Hispanic respondents, blacks receive the highest average negative stereotype ratings. The single most negative rating of blacks among all groups occurs on the welfare-dependency trait. There is also a tendency for welfare dependency to be the negative trait most attributed to Hispanics as well. The most negative rating of Asians occurs consistently on the "hard to get along with" dimension, as expected.

Stereotypes are usually correlated with racial residential integration attitudes. As stereotypes become more negative, opposition to residential integration tends to increase. This pattern is strongest and most consistent among white respondents, but there is also a trend in this direction among blacks, Hispanics, and Asians.

IS IT PERCEIVED SOCIAL CLASS DIFFERENCES?

Before turning to multivariate analyses, we consider the bivariate relation of perceived socioeconomic status differences and attitudes on residential integration. We tapped perceived socioeconomic status differences with two measures. The first is a simple bipolar trait-rating question that asked respondents to rank each major racial/ethnic group on a 1 to 7 continuum where 1 meant most group members "tended to be rich" and 7 meant most group

TABLE 4: Race and Mean Stereotype Trait Ratings[a]

Target group	Respondent Race			
	Whites	Blacks	Hispanics	Asians
Whites				
Unintelligent	3.31	3.18 (.11)	2.84 (.18)	3.07 (.11)
Prefer welfare	2.67	2.97 (-.02)	2.96 (.01)	2.72 (-.00)
Hard to get along with	3.08	3.50 (.18)	3.10 (.18)	3.07 (.07)
Stereotype rating	3.02	3.21 (.12)	2.97 (.17)	2.95 (.08)
Blacks				
Unintelligent	4.05 (.20)	3.60	3.77 (.10)	4.27 (.28)
Prefer welfare	4.10 (.29)	3.98	5.22 (.10)	4.84 (.28)
Hard to get along with	3.81 (.19)	3.57	4.55 (.18)	4.02 (.25)
Stereotype rating	4.00 (.31)	3.72	4.51 (.19)	4.37 (.35)
Hispanics				
Unintelligent	3.98 (.19)	4.05 (.09)	3.50	4.07 (.20)
Prefer welfare	3.86 (.19)	4.30 (.07)	4.00	4.47 (.11)
Hard to get along with	3.52 (.26)	3.69 (.09)	2.98	3.66 (.16)
Stereotype rating	3.79 (.29)	4.02 (.11)	3.50	4.06 (.21)
Asians				
Unintelligent	3.29 (.07)	3.30 (-.06)	2.88 (.03)	3.04
Prefer welfare	2.74 (.20)	3.01 (-.03)	3.21 (.08)	2.89
Hard to get along with	3.82 (.25)	4.24 (.24)	4.07 (.11)	3.18
Stereotype rating	3.29 (.25)	3.52 (.08)	3.39 (.11)	3.03

[a] Figures are means on a 1 to 7 scale where 7 is the negative end of a bipolar rating continuum. Figures in parentheses are zero-order correlations of the stereotype measure with residential integration attitudes.

members "tended to be poor." The second measure is a difference score between a respondent's in-group rating on this measure and his or her rating of each out-group. A score of zero on this measure would thus indicate a perception of no average economic status difference between groups, positive scores would indicate a perception that one's in-group was of higher economic status than the out-group, and negative scores on the difference measure would indicate a perception that one's in-group members were of lower economic status. Results for both measures are shown in panel A of Table 5. Panel B reports the correlation of each measure, by respondent race and target group race/ethnicity, with racial residential integration attitudes.

All respondents tend to perceive a similar pattern of economic status differences between groups. In broad terms, these perceived differences conform to actual average patterns of difference in economic status (Hirschman 1983).

TABLE 5: Perceived Status Differences and Residential Integration Attitudes

	Panel A: Mean Group Rating[a]			
	Respondent Race			
Target group	Whites	Blacks	Hispanics	Asians
Whites				
Mean group rating	3.50	3.10	3.03	3.00
In-group/out-group difference	—	-1.95	-1.46	-.43
Blacks				
Mean group rating	5.04	5.03	4.71	5.17
In-group/out-group difference	1.55	—	.22	1.74
Hispanics				
Mean group rating	5.00	5.20	4.49	4.82
In-group/out-group difference	1.51	.17	—	1.40
Asians				
Mean group rating	3.51	3.65	3.33	3.42
In-group/out-group difference	.01	-1.38	-1.16	—

[a] Figures in the upper row are means on a 1 to 7 scale where 1 means "rich" and 7 means "poor." Figures in the lower row are differences scores between in-group rating and out-group rating.

Thus, blacks and Hispanics are the groups most likely to be rated toward the poor end of the continuum and Asians and whites most likely to be rated toward the rich end of the continuum. The perceived in-group versus out-group difference mirrors this pattern as well. For example, whites and Asians both see blacks and Hispanics as lagging behind them economically, but on average see little difference in economic status between one another. As panel B shows, however, neither the absolute perceived economic status nor the perceived status difference is substantially correlated with a respondent's racial residential integration attitudes. Out of 24 possible instances only 4 correlations attain significance at the .01 level, and one of these is in the wrong direction. *In sum, concern about perceived differences in economic status is unlikely to be a powerful component of how respondents form their attitudes on racial residential integration.*

It is important to determine whether the bivariate patterns summarized to this point persist in a fuller multivariate analysis. There are important differences among respondents and across groups in educational attainment, income, sex distribution, and nativity. Therefore we conducted a series of OLS regression analyses that controlled for these factors and then introduced, in separate

TABLE 5: Perceived Status Differences and Residential Integration Attitudes

	Panel B: Correlations[b]			
	Respondent Race			
Target group	Whites	Blacks	Hispanics	Asians
Whites				
Group rating	—	-.01	.11*	.06
In-group/out-group difference	—	.01	.02	.01
Blacks				
Group rating	.02	—	.03*	.18
In-group/out-group difference	.02	—	.01	.13
Hispanics				
Group rating	.07	.11*	—	.09
In-group/out-group difference	.03	.06	—	.03
Asians				
Group rating	.03	-.14*	.03	—
In-group/out-group difference	.02	-.07	.02	—

[b] Figures are Pearson correlations with the residential integration attitudes measure.

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

models, the in-group affect measure, the out-group affect measure, and the affective differentiation measure. Each model included the perceived economic status difference measure and the stereotype index rating. These results are shown in Table 6.

In only 3 of 12 possible instances did the in-group preference measure exhibit a significant relationship with the residential social distance measure. Of note, two of these occur for whites and involve reactions to contact with the *racially* distinct out-groups: blacks and Asians. This pattern confirms the longstanding sociological observation that differences perceived as racial rather than ethnic in nature are often more socially divisive (Lieberson 1980; Stone 1985). Simple in-group favoritism is, plainly, not a powerful determinant of social distance attitudes. It has no effect whatever among Hispanic or Asian respondents and works in the wrong direction (according to the preference model) for blacks' reactions to Hispanics.

The perceived SES gap measures, with only one exception, are not related to social distance feelings. The one instance of a significant effect, ironically, is in the direction opposite to expectation. The larger the gap blacks see between

TABLE 6: Multivariate Regression Coefficients Examining the Effects of Perceived SES Gap, Affective Ratings, and Stereotypes on Residential Integration Attitudes

	In-Group Affect	Out-Group Affect	Difference	Perceived SES Gap	Stereotype Rating	R^2
			White Respondents			
Target group						
Blacks	.11***	—	—	-.00	.29***	.11
	—	-.17***	—	-.01	.27***	.13
	—	—	.31***	-.01	.25***	.19
Hispanics	.06	—	—	.01	.26***	.07
	—	-.22***	—	.02	.22**	.11
	—	—	.29***	.01	.20**	.15
Asians	.12**	—	—	.00	.24***	.09
	—	-.27***	—	.02	.17***	.15
	—	—	.38***	.03	.16***	.21
			Black Respondents			
Whites	-.07	—	—	-.06	.17***	.04
	—	-.18***	—	-.04	.13*	.07
	—	—	.08	-.04	.15**	.04
Hispanics	-.12*	—	—	.05	.11*	.06
	—	-.28***	—	.05	.08	.12
	—	—	.15**	.03	.12*	.06
Asians	-.03	—	—	-.12*	-.11*	.04
	—	-.32***	—	-.08	.05	.14
	—	—	.26***	-.08	.08	.11
			Hispanic Respondents			
Whites	-.03	—	—	.00	.15**	.06
	—	-.13**	—	-.00	.14**	.08
	—	—	.09	.00	.15**	.07
Blacks	-.03	—	—	.04	.16**	.03
	—	-.15**	—	.03	.13*	.05
	—	—	.11*	.04	.16**	.04
Asians	-.01	—	—	.01	.09	.03
	—	-.13**	—	.02	.06	.04
	—	—	.10*	.03	.08	.04
			Asian Respondents			
Whites	.00	—	—	-.04	.07	.03
	—	-.15*	—	-.03	.03	.05
	—	—	.15*	-.02	.06	.05
Blacks	-.07	—	—	.08	.31***	.13
	—	-.21***	—	.10	.25***	.17
	—	—	.14*	.09	.26***	.15
Hispanics	-.08	—	—	.08	.18**	.04
	—	-.24***	—	.09	.10	.09
	—	—	.15*	.08	.13	.06

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

themselves and Asians, the more open they are to residential contact with Asians. In short, what an individual assumes about the average economic status of out-groups has little to do with willingness to enter a substantially integrated community.

The various prejudice measures have far more consistent and stronger effects on social distance feelings. The effects of prejudice vary with the measure and, to a degree, with the race of the respondent and the race of the target group.

The most consistent effects are found for the out-group affect measure. Across each of the 12 tests, we found that as affect toward an out-group improved, opposition to residential contact significantly declined. Indeed, even for the two occasions when in-group affect has the anticipated effect, it is clear that the increment to variance explained above the baseline model is greater for the out-group affect measure. Out-group affect matters irrespective of race of the respondent and irrespective of race of the target group.

The affective differentiation measure influences social distance feelings, particularly among white respondents. Although sometimes a significant predictor among black, Hispanic, and Asian respondents, it adds no more to the amount of variance explained and typically less than the out-group affect measure. That is, affective differentiation is a uniquely potent predictor of social distance feelings among white respondents. The implication is that they are maintaining a social status difference, as opposed to expressing mere in-group preference or out-group hostility.

Finally, negative stereotypes are typically significant predictors of social distance preferences. Negative stereotypes are most consistently important among white respondents. The effects are less consistent among minority respondents, especially among Asians, and to a degree, among Hispanics.[7]

ON LINKING ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR

We do not have measures of a respondent's recent residential moves or future intentions. Hence, we cannot examine whether change occurred (or might occur) in an attitude-(in)consistent manner. However, the 1992 LACSS did ask respondents to report on the main ethnic group in their neighborhoods, on whether the neighborhood was undergoing ethnic change, and if so, what the nature of the change was. A brief consideration of these data sheds a small amount of light on possible attitude-behavior connections.

Our data on reported neighborhood composition and change are both reassuringly consistent with familiar demographic analysis results and, more important, with the attitudinal patterns reported above. The upper panel of Table 7 shows that blacks are the group most likely to live among coethnics (64.7%) and the least likely to live in largely white areas (4.5%). Likewise, whites are the second most likely to report sharing residential space with coethnics (58.2%) and the least likely to report living in largely black areas (4.9%). Asians are the minority group most likely to report living in largely white areas (20.8%), a pattern supported by the high proportion of whites who report living in largely Asian areas (17.3%). Both Asians and blacks show high

proportions reporting that they live in largely Hispanic areas, 19.4% and 17.7%, respectively.[8]

The second panel shows that blacks are the group most likely to report that their neighborhoods are undergoing ethnic change (61.8%), followed by whites at 56.1%. In general, the experience of ethnic residential change is common in Los Angeles County, with roughly half of Asian and Latino respondents also reporting that their neighborhoods are undergoing change.

The nature of these changes is made a bit clearer in the lowest panel of Table 7. Among those reporting that a change was taking place, blacks overwhelmingly report (77.8%) that their neighborhoods are becoming more Hispanic. The modal response among both Latinos and Asians, however, is that their neighborhoods are experiencing an influx of coethnics, 45.5% and 66.2%, respectively. These patterns presumably reflect the high rates of new immigration for these groups (Waldinger 1989). Whites undergoing change most often report that their neighborhoods are becoming more Asian (50.3%), followed by an increasing number of Hispanics (31.1%). Few whites see their neighborhoods becoming more black. This is a telling contrast with whites' high and increasing frequency of residential contact with Asians. Blacks and Asians now constitute roughly equal proportions of the population in Los Angeles county, but whites — in a pattern directly consistent with the attitudinal results we have reported — are now far more likely to share residential space with Asians than with blacks and are far more likely than blacks to anticipate the substantial future movement of Asians into their neighborhoods.

Although we cannot test the hypothesis that attitudes directly translate into residential choices and aggregate housing patterns, the results in Table 8, which show the association between reported neighborhood composition and our residential integration attitude measure, are suggestive. First and foremost, a significant association between attitude and reported residential neighborhood composition occurs most consistently among white respondents. White respondents living in mainly white (37.2%) or mainly Asian neighborhoods (43.7%) are highly likely to object to residential integration with blacks. Whites from the same two types of communities are also the most likely to object to residential integration with Hispanics. These patterns are consistent with national survey results reported by Sigelman and Welch (1993), who find more positive racial attitudes among whites who have black neighbors.

We are much less likely to observe an association between attitude and reported residential composition among blacks, Asians, and Hispanics than among whites. The only exceptions to this case occur when blacks are the target of the residential integration question among those Latino and Asian respondents who live in coethnic-dominated neighborhoods or in largely white neighborhoods. In particular, Asian respondents living in mainly white or mainly Asian neighborhoods express the absolute highest levels of objection to residential integration with blacks, 52.7% and 50.8%, respectively.

It is impossible to judge from these data whether attitudes led to the current residential locations, or whether residential location comes to affect attitude. Cross-sectional data face a severe constraint in this regard, as others have observed (Jackman & Crane 1986). In all likelihood, there are reciprocal effects

TABLE 7: Respondent Race and Actual Residential Patterns

	Race of Respondent			
	White	Hispanic	Black	Asian
Neighborhood composition				
Mainly white	58.2	12.2	4.5	20.8
Mainly black	4.9	23.9	64.7	6.5
Mainly Hispanic	13.2	40.1	17.7	19.4
Mainly Asian	17.3	15.3	1.3	45.9
Mixed	6.4	8.4	11.9	7.5
Total (percent)	100	99.9	100.1	100.1
	(622)	(476)	(470)	(279)
$\chi^2 = 1069.69$				
df = 12				
$p < .001$				
Neighborhood ethnic composition changing				
Yes	56.1	48.4	61.8	48.9
No	43.9	51.6	38.2	51.1
Total (percent)	100	100	100	100
	(624)	(477)	(482)	(284)
$\chi^2 = 21.78$				
df = 3				
$p < .001$				
Ethnic change				
More black	6.6	11.3	5.7	11.5
More Hispanic	31.1	45.5	77.8	14.4
More Asian	50.3	36.8	5.1	66.2
More white	4.0	4.8	7.7	5.0
More mixed	8.0	1.7	3.7	2.9
Total (percent)	100	100	100	100
	(350)	(231)	(297)	(139)
$\chi^2 = 311.13$				
df = 12				
$p < .001$				

TABLE 8: Percentage Objecting to Residential Integration by Main Racial/ Ethnic Group in Respondent Neighborhood

	Respondent Neighborhood Composition			
	Mainly White	Mainly Black	Mainly Hispanic	Mainly Asian
White respondents				
Target group				
Black***	37.2 (352)	6.7 (30)	35.8 (81)	43.7 (103)
Hispanic***	28.8 (351)	10.0 (30)	22.2 (81)	26.4 (106)
Asian**	25.6 (352)	6.7 (30)	24.7 (81)	18.9 (106)
Black respondents				
Target group				
White	0.0 (9)	8.9 (303)	8.5 (82)	16.7 (6)
Hispanic	33.3 (21)	20.1 (303)	21.9 (82)	16.7 (6)
Asian	23.8 (21)	18.9 (301)	19.3 (83)	16.7 (6)
Hispanic respondents				
Target group				
White	5.2 (58)	13.1 (114)	7.4 (190)	4.1 (73)
Black*	33.9 (56)	28.1 (114)	37.4 (190)	27.4 (73)
Asian	26.3 (57)	19.5 (113)	21.3 (188)	15.1 (73)
Asian respondents				
Target group				
White	5.2 (58)	11.1 (18)	3.8 (53)	7.9 (127)
Black*	52.7 (55)	22.2 (18)	45.3 (53)	50.8 (126)
Hispanic	31.0 (58)	22.2 (18)	26.9 (52)	28.0 (125)

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

with attitude shaping location decisions to as great an extent as resources, information, and other considerations allow, while the experience of particular neighborhoods, group relations, and status and service considerations then come to reshape attitudes (Galster 1989; Sigelman & Welch 1993).

The implications of the Table 7 and Table 8 results taken as a whole, however, tend to point in the direction of racial attitudes contributing to housing location decisions and patterns. At minimum, the data suggest that many whites living in white neighborhoods, and other minorities living in white neighborhoods or in coethnic-dominated neighborhoods are likely to resist the

entry of blacks into their communities. These results strongly parallel recent analysis by Massey and Gross (1991). They argued that, despite evidence of declining residential segregation between 1970 and 1980, there still is a very low upper bound on white willingness to share residential space with blacks. Aggregate segregation declines only to the extent that it does not increase the likelihood of black-white contact much above the 1980 average proportion of .053. Likewise, Farley and Frey (1994:40) found that the largest declines in segregation took place "in metropolitan areas in which blacks made up a small percentage of the neighborhood of the typical white."

The extraordinarily high level of black-white isolation is thus unlikely to break down quickly, even while minority groups of comparable proportionate representation in the population make substantial entry, at least relative to blacks, into white communities. The pattern of attitude distribution and dynamics we have documented seems very much a constitutive element of this process of residential mobility for some and continued apartheidlike conditions for others.

Discussion and Conclusions

We began this research with the goal of examining the mere in-group preference, perceived economic status differences, and prejudice models as hypotheses about the nature of racial residential integration attitudes. Our results provide virtually no support for the in-group preference or the perceived economic status difference hypotheses. We do find general patterns of ethnocentrism, yet ethnocentrism alone is a small component of attitudes on residential integration, irrespective of the race of the target group or of the respondent. We do find consensually held perceptions of racial/ethnic group differences in average economic status, yet these perceived differences in status play almost no role in residential integration attitudes. In short, in order to understand attitudes on racial residential integration we must be expressly concerned with views about other racial/ethnic groups.

Prejudice does appear to be an important element of how respondents form their views on residential integration. The type or form of prejudice that shapes residential integration attitudes appears to depend, however, on majority or dominant group status versus minority or subordinate group status. We find that among white respondents the affective differentiation measure is a strong predictor of residential integration attitudes. Its effects always exceed those of in-group preference and of out-group hostility. In addition, the stereotyping measure is consistently influential among white respondents, irrespective of the minority target group. Among minority respondents it is more often the case that out-group hostility exceeds affective differentiation in importance. What is more, the effects of stereotyping are a good deal less consistent for minority respondents.

We believe that the best substantive reconciliation of these incommensurate patterns is to acknowledge that the U.S. has a relatively clear-cut racial/ethnic hierarchy, or racial order, at least at its top and bottom ranks. The historical and present dominant social group is white Americans. The historical (and at least

perceptually, if not also in fact) present bottom group is African Americans. (See Jaynes & Williams 1989; Massey & Denton 1993.) For blacks, Latinos, and Asians, economic and social advancement is associated with greater proximity and similarity to white Americans. For whites, integration — especially with blacks — brings the threat of a loss of relative status advantages. As a result, attitudes on an issue like racial residential integration are likely to have very different meanings to whites than to members of any of the minority groups, even comparatively affluent Asians. Until such time as Asians have long occupied a status of comparable socioeconomic status with whites, even members of this group should view the prospect of residential contact with whites as upward mobility. Whites are the group, then, most likely to view any increased racial residential integration — with any other group — as changing traditional status relations of relative dominance and privilege. That is, they tend to view integration with any of the minority groups as threatening or undermining a previous status relation of superiority. It is for this reason, we speculate, that the affective differentiation measure assumes greater importance to the attitudes of whites than it does for any of the minorities. Minorities cannot view one another as threats to a traditionally privileged status in quite this fashion. Instead, if minorities express aversion to residential contact with members of other groups, it tends to be based more directly on affective hostility to that group, not an effort to preserve a longstanding relation of privileged status.

Our analysis can be read both positively and negatively. Two aspects of our results suggest that racial residential segregation may continue its gradual decline. First, average levels of openness to substantial integration, even among whites in reaction to large numbers of black neighbors, was fairly high. Second, the basic human tendency toward ethnocentrism, although evident in our data, has comparatively little to do with attitudes on racial residential integration. Both these patterns are consistent with the general trend toward more tolerant racial attitudes (Schuman, Steeh & Bobo 1985) and modest declines in actual levels of residential segregation (Farley & Frey 1994).

These sanguine results notwithstanding, we believe that on balance our analysis is consistent with the conclusions of Farley et al. (1994), Galster (1988), Massey and Denton (1993), Yinger (1986), and others who argue that both individual and institutional discrimination still contribute to the high levels of racial residential segregation. Negative stereotypes of blacks and Latinos are fairly common. Among whites these stereotypes and racial prejudice as a sense of group position translate into attitudes on residential integration. Among minorities, hostile feelings toward other groups shape resistance to residential integration. What is more, attitudes on residential integration appear to have a connection to actual places of residence. Each of these patterns is consistent with the mounting evidence of ongoing patterns of individual and institutional discrimination in the housing market (Turner 1992; Yinger 1991).

In particular, our results suggest that the high rates of black-white residential separation are likely to continue, even in an extraordinarily diverse metropolitan area such as Los Angeles. To be sure, Farley and Frey (1994) found that areas with larger nonblack minority populations had lower overall levels of black-white segregation in 1990. *Such communities, however, did not experience*

higher rates of decline in black-white segregation between 1980 and 1990. Our data may shed some light on this failure of the "buffer" hypothesis. A nontrivial fraction of Latinos and an even larger fraction of the Asian population hold negative stereotypes of blacks and react against the prospect of sharing residential space with blacks. Indeed, Asians were more hostile to blacks than were whites on each of our prejudice measures and in expression of residential integration attitudes. Hence, rather than operating as a "buffer" or source of greater options for blacks, ethnic diversity may in many instances simply add to the climate of resistance to blacks as neighbors.

Notes

1. It is necessary to note that we regard racial and ethnic distinctions as socially defined constructs (See & Wilson 1989; Stone 1985). Racial/ethnic categories and labels are variable across time and place in meaning as well as salience. Racial/ethnic distinctions also interact with class and gender. In designing the questionnaire, we decided to use the labels "whites," "blacks," "Asians," or "Asian Americans," and "Hispanic" or "Hispanic Americans." This decision rested on three considerations. First and foremost, our pretest results clearly indicated that these are widely used and well understood terms. Second, although it would have been ideal, it was not feasible to develop a questionnaire fully sensitive to even a limited range of national origin subgroups within the heterogeneous Latino (i.e., Mexican, Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, etc.) and Asian (i.e., Korean, Japanese, Chinese, etc.) populations. Third, there are strong reasons to believe that social interaction and discourse are often dominated by reliance upon stereotypes linked to the broad racial/ethnic categories we have used (see Bobo & Hutchings 1994 for a fuller discussion). This is not to deny the importance of variability based on national origin, class, and gender. Rather, it is a concession to the powerful evidence that racial/ethnic cues involving these four broad categories often precede and sometimes overwhelm these other group statuses in social interaction, especially where questions of racial residential integration are concerned.

2. Farley et al. (1993) show that Detroit area blacks made rent and mortgage payments comparable to those necessary for many suburban residences. Among homeowners, the black-white gap was $250; however, 60% of blacks owning homes in the central city area and 52% of suburban whites had monthly housing expenditures between $300 and $799 per month. The gap for renters was even smaller, and 61% of both blacks and whites had gross rent payments between $300 and $599 per month. Farley et al. (1993) point out that the Detroit area is characterized by a declining housing market, reporting a 6% decrease — to $68,000 — in the median price of single-family dwellings between 1980 and 1990.

3. Despite Clark's claims of neutral ethnocentrism, Clark finds that whites express the strongest preferences for having a majority of their neighbors from their own race, with almost no whites expressing interest in living in neighborhoods that are less than 50% white. Moreover, whites, Hispanics, and Asians all express the strongest desire for own-race neighbors when the target group is blacks, and blacks and Asians express the strongest desire for neighborhoods with a substantial number of whites (Clark 1992). Blacks' expressed preferences for 50/50 white neighborhoods may represent preferences for higher-quality neighborhoods, rather than a desire to live and interact with whites (Clark 1992:455). Neighborhoods with a substantial number of whites often have higher-quality schools and services, and blacks — and other excluded groups — are well aware of these differences. While there is likely to be some validity to the desire for higher-quality neighborhood services (Farley et al. 1993:22), blacks also place a great deal of importance on integration, racial harmony, and effective interaction with whites (Farley et al. 1978; Farley et al. 1993; Pettigrew 1973).

4. We compared the LACSS data to 1990 census distributions on nativity, sex, education, age, family income, and occupation. The only noteworthy differences emerged, generally, on the education variable and did so in ways typical for telephone surveys. Our sample is better educated than the population at large, particularly among blacks and Latinos. It should be

borne in mind that not all households have telephones in them and that telephone coverage varies by social class and by race/ethnicity, with whites more often living in telephone households than do blacks or Latinos (Groves & Kahn 1979; Thornberry & Massey 1988). In particular, the LACSS data underrepresented high school graduates. In addition, as a result of the large number of Asian nationality groups and languages — 19 different nations of origin were found among Asians in the sample — it was impractical to develop additional foreign language translations of the questionnaire. Thus, even though 70% of our Asian respondents were nonnatives, this figure is substantially below the 1990 census figures for Los Angeles County (88%).

5. The data are not shown, but can be obtained from the authors upon request.

6. The format of the stereotyping measures was taken directly from the 1990 General Social Survey (Bobo & Kluegel 1991; Smith 1991), which included a series of bipolar trait-rating items. The bipolar trait-rating format has been shown to increase respondent comfort in expressing racial/ethnic group distinctions (Jackman & Senter 1983), to produce evidence of much higher levels of negative stereotyping than do older forced-choice formats (e.g., compare reported perceptions of blacks as less intelligent from Schuman, Steeh & Bobo 1985 to those reported by Bobo & Kluegel 1991 and Smith 1991), and to yield reasonably reliable and valid measures of prejudice (Bobo & Kluegel 1993; Farley et al. 1994).

7. To this point our analyses strongly contradict the mere in-group preference hypothesis advanced by Clark. One possible objection to our results could be that we find a much stronger role for prejudice than for mere in-group preferences because of the dependent variable. Our residential integration measures tap out-group social distance, which differs from expression of preferred neighborhood composition. In order to see whether our results are robust using a preference dependent measure, we conducted analyses of data from the 1976 National Election Study Survey (Miller & Miller 1977). This national probability sample of adults 18 years of age or older contained feeling thermometer measures and a neighborhood preference question. The latter asked: "Would you personally prefer to live in a neighborhood that is all (white/black), mostly (white/black), about half (white/black) and half (black/white), or mostly (black/white)?" For the analyses reported below, high scores indicate responses of mostly opposite race and low scores indicate expressed preference for all same-race neighbors. Unfortunately, the 1976 NES did not include reasonable proxies for perceived economic status differences or group stereotypes.

As was found for our 1992 LACSS data, the thermometer measures for both black and white respondents reveal clear in-group preference or ethnocentrism. Blacks' mean rating for "blacks" was 86.7, as compared to 68.4 for "whites." Among whites, the mean in-group rating was 74.2 as compared to 58.8 for "blacks." Among blacks we found no significant correlation between in-group rating (r = -.08), out-group rating (r = .02), or affective differentiation (r = -.11) and responses to the neighborhood preference question. Among whites, there are significant correlations between neighborhood preference and in-group rating (r = -.23), out-group rating (r = .23), and, most important, affective differentiation (r = -.38). This pattern of associations among white respondents is consistent in the South and non-South.

OLS regression models support our earlier findings with one qualification. The strongest predictor of neighborhood preferences, net of education, age, region, sex, and family income among whites, was the affective differentiation measure. Entered singly, or jointly, however, we do find significant effects of in-group affect and of out-group affect among white NES respondents. Measures of in-group affect appear to play a stronger role when predicting a neighborhood composition preference item as opposed to a social distance item (setting aside for the moment possible change over time and sample composition differences between the 1976 NES and 1992 LACSS data). Among blacks, only the affective differentiation measure has a significant effect. On the whole, however, examination of a different dependent measure confirms key findings based on the LACSS data.

8. Patterns for the questions on perceived neighborhood racial composition parallel analysis of actual residential patterns from census data in two other important ways. First, our data are consistent with census data showing that middle class blacks are less able to translate their class status into greater residential proximity to whites (Farley & Frey 1994; Kain 1986). Eighty-one percent of blacks with family incomes of $60,000 or more reported living in mostly black neighborhoods as compared to just 11% who report living in mostly white neighborhoods. In

contrast, 33% of Asians in this high-income category reported living in largely Asian neighborhoods and an equal 33% report living in largely white areas (three times the rate for high-income blacks). Similarly, only 26% of high-income Hispanics reported living in largely Hispanic neighborhoods, and 47% reported living in largely white neighborhoods (more than four times the rate observed among blacks).

Second, among both Latinos and Asians, native respondents — more so than the foreign-born — report that they live in largely white neighborhoods (Ong, Lawrence & Davidson 1992). These figures are 19% versus 9% comparing native-born and foreign-born Latinos. The comparison for Asians is 24% versus 19%.

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