A VOLUME IN THE MULTI-CITY STUDY OF URBAN INEQUALITY

Prismatic Metropolis

INEQUALITY IN LOS ANGELES

LAWRENCE D. BOBO, MELVIN L. OLIVER,
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RACIAL ATTITUDES IN A PRISMATIC METROPOLIS: MAPPING IDENTITY, STEREOTYPES, COMPETITION, AND VIEWS ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Lawrence D. Bobo and Devon Johnson

How and why do racial attitudes influence patterns of urban inequality? At least since W. E. B. DuBois completed his pioneering study, *The Philadelphia Negro*, in 1899, students of urban social phenomena have tackled this question. In DuBois's era, the effects of racial prejudice and the necessity to incorporate them into any sensible social analysis were unambiguous. (For a fuller treatment of DuBois's discussion of racial prejudice in *The Philadelphia Negro*, see Bobo, 2000.) Contemporary scholars still face these questions, but the extent and effects of negative racial attitudes have become less transparent. Accordingly, examinations of job prospects for low-skilled workers (Holzer 1996) and of ghetto joblessness (Wilson 1996) pay close attention to employers' racial preferences and stereotypes as well as to points of racial friction in employer-worker interaction (Jencks 1992; Feagin and Sikes 1994). Similarly, assessments of urban housing market dynamics and residential segregation direct attention to racial preferences and attitudes (Massey and Denton 1993; Yinger 1995; Farley et al., 1994; Zubrinsky and Bobo 1996).

But simple generalizations about the nature and effects of racial identities, attitudes, and beliefs elude these analysts. Indeed, perhaps the only certain truth of race and ethnic relations in the modern urban metropolis is that they are complex and contradictory. In the broadest sense, our goal is to better inform structural analyses of modern urban labor and housing markets by providing a map of the basic contours of racial attitudes and beliefs in multiracial Los Angeles.

The general salience of racial attitudes and identities is undeniable. Scenes of misunderstanding, conflict, and even open bigotry in Los Angeles (or any major urban area in the United States), are not difficult to call to mind. Imagine a tense situation where angry words are exchanged in a housing project between the equally poor black and Latino residents, as some Latino residents fearful of victimization by blacks demand segregated units. Imagine the affluent black residents of Ladera Heights complaining of the litter, trespassing, and rude behavior of Latino day laborers who mill about each morning seeking work at a large household supply store in the area. Consider the mutual frustration of a struggling Latina housekeeper who comes up a few dollars short on the week's bag of groceries and has a hostile exchange with the Korean store owner who has just told her to leave if she doesn't have enough money. Imagine the circumstances of a black roofing contractor driving through the wealthy Encino area looking for the address of his next job when a white police officer pulls him over because neighbors have reported a suspicious-looking man in the area. Imagine tensions within the labor movement as older, traditional white leaders vie with younger Latinos for positions of power. Consider the general sense of unease with the racial divide conveyed in a front-page *Los Angeles Times* story written months before the 1992 riots:

> Cultural collisions, often violent, occasionally fatal, are occurring every day. Hostilities between black residents and Korean shop-keepers, Latinos and blacks vying for jobs at Martin Luther King Jr./Drew Medical Center, interracial fighting at Lawndale high school, and repeated charges of police brutality against minorities—all of this is disturbing the city's racial peace in a way that has some political analysts recalling Watts. [Frank Clifford, "Tension Among Minorities Upsets Old Rules of Politics." *Los Angeles Times*, August 11, 1991, p. A1]

The writer could not know how prophetic these words would prove to be.[1]

Conflict and division are only part of the story of race in Los Angeles. Imagine a situation where working-class Latino and African American neighbors join together to fight the dumping of hazardous waste in their community. Consider the case of Locke High School, where black and Latino students struggle both to excel academically and to build intergroup harmony. Envision the commitment of a trio of black, Latino, and Asian community leaders who draft a call for progressive leadership on race and found the Multicultural Collaborative. Imagine a prominent white female television newscaster serving, at first with trepidation, on a multiracial jury: "We were seven blacks, four whites, and one Latino—nine women, and three men of diverse education, and of ages spanning six decades. I got the feeling that as a group we probably would not be able to agree to walk out of a burning building together." She subsequently leaves the experience feeling hopeful: "I cannot explain the dynamic of that particular society of twelve—you had to be there. Though we were a mixed batch, race was never an issue. During the deliberations it was as if nobody had a life outside that room. We were totally focused on the job we were there to do, and we did that job" (Kelly Lange, "Strangers, 12 of Them, Reach Across Gulfs of Age, Race and Experience," *Los Angeles Times*, June 7, 1995, p. B7). Imagine black and Korean ministers facilitating group reconciliation or a Korean American radio broadcast establishing a regular "Listening to African American Voices" program. Picture the elderly Japanese American and African American neighbors of Leimert Park getting together to go bowling or marvel at the multiracial parade of "low-riders" cruising down Crenshaw Boulevard on a Sunday evening. Take pride as the white and Asian high school students on the Academic Decathlon team of the affluent El Camino Real High School head off for the national competition.[2]

These scenes attest to the enormous range of situations and sample some of the best and worst of all that is involved with racial and ethnic "diversity." But perhaps most important, each of these scenes is real. And each is refracted through social lenses that inevitably attend to the racial and ethnic background of those involved. In this respect, at least, the dynamics of urban life in Los Angeles resemble life in most of the nation's major urban areas.

These scenes raise a number of analytical and substantive questions about the nature of racial and ethnic attitudes and identities in Los Angeles. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a basic mapping of the social psychological aspects of race that may impinge on the dynamics of inequality. We are not concerned with a single domain such as the labor market or the housing market, nor do we examine a single outcome (that is, wages) or specific research hypothesis (that is, spatial mismatch). Our objective is to take stock of the underlying potential for racial and ethnic identifiers, or assumptions and preferences springing from them, to affect social interaction across a wide array of settings and situations. In this chapter we provide a portrait of the basic underlying contours of public thinking on the subject of race in Los Angeles.

Scenarios and Theoretical Background

Racial identities, attitudes, and beliefs are internally complex phenomena, and our empirical results reflect much of that complexity. In this

section we sketch two useful hypothetical or ideal scenarios for patterns of racial and ethnic attitudes and set what we do in the context of four core theoretical models of the nature of racial attitudes.

Possible Scenarios

As the magnitude, the reach across domains of life, and the stability of racial inequality vary, so too will the patterning of racial attitudes and belief that become bound up with those social circumstances (Jackman 1994). At least since the formulation of Robert E. Park's (1926) race relations cycle, social scientists have recognized stages or modalities to situations of interracial contact (Stone 1985). Thus, for example, comparative race and ethnic relations researchers have drawn a distinction between paternalistic social systems and competitive social systems (Van den Berghe 1967). Paternalistic systems (that is, slave or caste societies) typically involve extensive hierarchy and inequality between groups. The minority or subordinate group comes to be viewed as backward, childlike, suited only for lowly positions and in need of supervision and direction. Competitive systems (that is, industrializing free labor societies) place an increased emphasis on achievement and meritocratic advancement. The greater mobility and success enjoyed by minority or subordinate group members encourages dominant group members to view them as clannish, underhanded, and competitive threats. In a parallel fashion, social psychologists have long recognized a distinction between dominative racism (hot, close, direct, blatant, and aggressive expressions of prejudice) and aversive racism (cold, sophisticated, impersonal, and distancing expressions of prejudice [see Kovel 1970; Gaertner and Dovidio 1986]). And more proximate to our concern with contemporary urban inequality, William Julius Wilson's pathbreaking analysis of the changing structure of black-white relations stressed distinctive historical epochs defined by stable configurations of the economy and polity with respect to the status of blacks (Wilson 1978). Different structures of racial inequality set different patterns for attendant racial identities, attitudes, and beliefs.

To better anchor the analyses and interpretations discussed in this chapter, we consider some ideal-typical scenarios that might exist. At one extreme, there may be sharp and long-standing racial inequalities that structure the workplace, neighborhoods, family life, and the larger sociocultural environment. Under such conditions racial and ethnic identities are likely to be central to individuals' understandings of themselves. In addition, one might expect to find extreme negative out-group stereotyping, high perceptions of threat and competition from other groups, and highly polarized views on whether government is obligated

to do anything about it. In sum, sharp and reinforcing structural cleavages between racial and ethnic groups in contact, all else equal, should manifest themselves in salient and polarized patterns of identity, attitude, and belief.

In contrast, the dynamics would be very different under conditions where racial inequalities are muted or nonexistent in the domains of work, neighborhood, family, and sociocultural environment. There would be little reason in such a structural setting to find highly salient racial group identities, and stereotypes would in all likelihood be quite muted themselves, if not obsolete. Similarly, there should be low or nonexistent concern about displacement by competitors from other racial groups. And to the extent that inequalities were still recognized as social problems, there might be a degree of consensus on the role that government should play in helping. Race would matter only when individuals wanted it to, and presumably this would be a freely exercised "option" that brought some enjoyment or benefit rather than misunderstanding, discrimination, and conflict (compare Waters 1990).

These two stylized extremes can be viewed as benchmarks against which to assess the meaning and implications of our results for Los Angeles. As we will show, Los Angeles of the 1990s falls in between the extreme scenarios of acute racial polarization and racial fluidity. Indeed, some elements of both types of scenarios operate depending on which set of group relations (such as, black and white as compared to Asian and white) and which particular indicator (perceptions of competition or opinions on affirmative action, for example) is under examination.

Theorizing Racial Attitudes

Substantive theories of racial attitudes can be usefully divided into four partially overlapping types, each of which tends to emphasize certain central variables or processes. The favored approach among sociologists can be labeled theories of intergroup ideology, dominance, and conflict (Jackman and Muha 1984; Jackman 1994; Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Bobo 1983; Bobo and Kluegel 1993). Approaches in this category tend to emphasize the implications of structured social inequality in access to valued social resources such as wealth, power, or prestige. The primary implication of such inequality is the development of self-interested or ideologically-based viewpoints that serve or favor the interests of one's own social group. The preeminent expositor of such a perspective is Herbert Blumer (1958), who developed a theory of prejudice as a sense of group position (see Bobo 1999). According to the theory, racial attitudes are not narrow individual expressions of like and dislike. Rather, they are preferences about the positional or status arrangement of racial groups

in relation to one another. The concern with group entitlements, privileges, and threats to customary privileges encourage prejudiced acts in this framework. Racial attitudes in these formulations have substantially instrumental and reasoned components and may respond to more immediate situational or contextual factors (for example, the relative size of a minority group population [see Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Glaser 1994; Taylor 1998]).

A second line of theorizing, favored among many social psychologists, can be labeled social learning models of prejudice (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1982; Katz 1991; Sears 1988). From this perspective, individuals learn the prevailing social conceptions about members of other groups from significant figures (such as parents, peers, community leaders, and eventually the media) as they grow up. But important stages in the process of learning are typically held to occur early in life and to begin with a bedrock of emotional or affective tonality. That is, before a child has developed any elaborate informational or cognitive ideas about members of other racial groups, he or she attends to the emotional valence of remarks and behaviors of significant figures in the socializing environment. This process of social learning establishes deeply rooted inclinations of sympathy or aversion, fear or embrace, toward particular social categories. As the individual matures this emotional bedrock helps to channel subsequent information and experiences in a consistent manner. The end product is the acquisition of the images and inclinations toward members of other racial groups commonly held by members of the individual's own social background. Racial attitudes in this formulation are centrally emotional and unreasoned and linked to early childhood upbringing in racially biased and largely homogeneous socializing contexts.

A third approach may be labeled the cognitive information processing model (Ashmore and Del Boca 1981; Stephan and Rosenfield 1982; Stephan 1985). This approach is centrally concerned with the nature and effects of stereotyping. It begins with the assumption that categorization—the process of creating simplifying constructs that allow us to process the almost infinite flood of stimuli bombarding us—is a natural human activity. This activity has regularities to it that apply whether the object of attention is a piece of furniture or another human being. For example, once a set of categories becomes established, it is cognitively easier to exaggerate the degree of between-category difference and to minimize the degree of within-category variation. Such fundamental biases in information processing have strong implications for the development of ideas and beliefs about members of different racial and ethnic categories. Because the creation of categories and the rules that

influence their operation are not specific to racial and ethnic phenomena, many cognitive psychologists do not accept a number of the common presumptions made about the notion of stereotyping. That is, many theorists do not assume that stereotypes are inherently inflexible, negative, nonresponsive to new information, or intrinsically bad.

The fourth type of theory involves personality models. Here the emphasis is on basic dynamics and motivational processes within the individual. The preeminent exemplar is *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno et al. 1950), which argues that racial and ethnic prejudice is most acute among those with broadly rigid, conventional, intolerant, unreflective personality styles or makeup. The authoritarian personality is predisposed to demeaning and aggressive behavior toward members of almost any out-group, not just those who might be realistic resource competitors or traditional objects of group socialization to dislike. Work in this tradition has faced severe methodological and conceptual problems (see Altemeyer 1988). However, there is a large body of evidence suggesting that the concept of authoritarianism, viewed as one of a range of social attitudes rather than as an aspect of deep Freudian personality structure, can give us a clue to why some individuals are particularly inclined to hostility toward racial and ethnic minorities (Altemeyer 1988; Duckitt 1992; Peffley and Hurwitz 1998).

For three reasons we adopt a catholic and descriptive approach for this chapter. First, although the LASUI measures are extensive, they are also limited in scope. The LASUI was designed to explore several complicated aspects of urban social life—the labor market, the housing market, and patterns of racial attitudes and beliefs. Though each domain received extensive coverage, none were exhaustively treated. An explicit decision was made in the design of the racial attitudes component of the questionnaire to emphasize measures of the most fundamental types of attitudes and beliefs (that is, identity), and those that had fairly direct implications for labor or housing market dynamics (stereotypes and group competition). As a result, many of the concepts and measures that might allow rigorous examination of competing theories of racial attitudes qua racial attitudes did not become elements of the LASUI survey (such as affect measures, general or abstract policy preferences, and other social and cultural value outlooks, such as individualism or egalitarianism; see Jackman 1977; Kluegel and Smith 1986).

Second, for the purpose of mapping the racial attitudes terrain, we share the analytical and theoretical eclecticism of Gordon Allport, who argued that: "There seems to be value in all of the . . . main approaches and some truth in virtually all of the resulting theories." Stating the case more concretely:

> A person acts with prejudice in the first instance because he perceives the object of prejudice in a certain way. But he perceives it in a certain way partly because his personality is what it is. And his personality is what it is chiefly because of the way he was socialized (training in family, school, neighborhood). The existing social situation is also a factor in his socialization and may also be a determinant of his perceptions. Behind these forces lie other valid but more remote causal influences. They involve the structure of society in which one lives, long-standing economic and cultural traditions, as well as national and historical influences of long duration. While these factors seem so remote as to be alien to the immediate psychological analysis of prejudiced acts, they are, nonetheless, important causal influences. [Allport 1954, 208]

This broad chain of logic remains apt today and undergirds all of the analyses and interpretations we present.

Third, our approach is to stress the multiracial character of Los Angeles and of the LASUI data, which provide an extraordinary opportunity to capture the dynamics of race in a heterogeneous urban environment. Theories of prejudice and racial attitudes were, overwhelmingly, developed with an eye toward understanding dominant group members' attitudes toward subordinate or minority group members. Prior theory and research thus provide little in the way of well-established guidance or expectations for situations as complex as those that exist in Los Angeles. Here we push the envelope by usually (though not always) asking parallel questions of members of each racial group.[3]

Analytical Focus and Strategy

Major Topical Domains

Our analysis focuses on measures of a sense of linked or common fate identity, on stereotypes, on perceptions of group competition for economic and political resources, and on opinions on affirmative action. By taking up these four outlooks, we address four core substantive questions:

(1) Do people see racial group membership as important in affecting outcomes in their own lives?

(2) What do people believe about the traits and predispositions of members of their own racial group and those of other groups?

(3) Are there weak or strong tendencies to see members of other racial and ethnic groups as competitive threats in the struggle for jobs and political influence?

(4) What social policies are people willing to support in order to ameliorate racial and ethnic inequality?

We structure our effort to address these questions around four analytical sets of questions:

(1) How sharply differentiated are members of the different racial and ethnic groups? That is, do white, black, Asian, and Latino respondents differ in the tendency to express a racial group attachment, to see other groups in negative terms, to perceive competitive group relations, or to support policies such as affirmative action?

(2) Are there other aspects of location in the social structure beyond race, such as economic status, gender, personal network, neighborhood, and workplace racial composition that shape racial attitudes and beliefs?

(3) Are there significant social psychological underpinnings of racial attitudes, such as broad political ideology or degree of religiosity?

(4) Does the immediate interview context influence the sorts of attitudes and beliefs that individuals express? That is, does the race of the interviewer or level of comfort talking about issues of race affect responses?

Our first and, in some sense, analytically most important task is to map and interpret group differences in attitudes and beliefs (question #1). The analytical primacy placed on group comparisons stems from our general concern with the structure and dynamics of group inequality wherein identities, attitudes, and beliefs lend meaning and coherence to the institutionalized or collective dimensions of social experience. As the sociologist Mary Jackman explained, such a focus

> draws attention to the structural conditions that encase an intergroup relationship and it underscores the point that individual actors are not free agents but are caught in an aggregate relationship. Unless we assume that the individual is socially atomized, her personal experiences constitute only one source of information that is evaluated against the backdrop of her manifold observations of the aggregated experiences (both historical and contemporaneous) of the group as a whole. [Jackman 1994, 119]

Group-level comparisons are central to but not exhaustive of our mission. Hence, as questions #2, 3, and 4 specify, we also examine critical sources of potential individual-level variation.

A bit more needs to be said about the issue of interview context. Survey researchers have long recognized that the interview setting, albeit stylized and more directed than most face-to-face encounters, is

nonetheless a social interaction (Schuman and Kalton 1985). As such, it is subject to influence by a variety of factors that may impinge on any social interaction. Characteristics of the interviewer may influence the views respondents feel willing or constrained to express, and individual respondents may vary in their sensitivity to topics covered in the interview.

It is now widely recognized that the race of the interviewer may affect a respondent's expression of racial attitudes. We conducted extensive analysis of the LASUI data to assess the impact of interviewer race and of respondent comfort discussing racial issues (see appendix 3A). In brief, we found generally low to moderate effects of race of interviewer and of interviewer observations of respondent discomfort. These effects were largest among foreign-born Latinos. However, we found few if any other consistent patterns of relationships between interviewer race and patterns of response, between social background characteristics and susceptibility to influence based on interviewer race or observed discomfort in answering questions on racial topics. We did not find strong evidence of social desirability pressures on patterns of response. Nonetheless, we routinely control for aspects of the interview context in the analyses reported in this chapter.

Variables and Logic of the Analysis

Table 3.1 lists the core racial attitude dependent variables and the four groups of independent variables used in the analysis. The former have already been discussed. The independent variables include a set of social background characteristics, measures of religion and social values, measures of personal, work, and neighborhood context, and measures of the interview context.

A word on each. Education is often, though not uniformly (Jackman and Muha 1984) found to encourage both more tolerant racial outlooks and, among minority groups, a heightened sense of group identity. Men are often found to express more negative racial attitudes than women. Older respondents, presumably as a result of critical socialization during less tolerant eras (rather than due to aging per se), often express more negative racial attitudes than do younger people (Schuman et al. 1997). The impact of income is less consistent than that of education, but especially in terms of specifying, for example, which members of a group feel competitive threat from members of other racial groups, it is clear that income can have important effects (Bobo and Hutchings 1996). Given the complexity of the racial makeup of Los Angeles and the extent to which immigration from Asia and Latin America have transformed the metropolis, we routinely examine the possibility that native-

TABLE 3.1 *Core Dependent and Independent Variables*

Core dependent variables
Common fate identity
Stereotypes
Perceived group competition (economic and political)
Opposition to affirmative action
Core independent variables
Social background characteristics
Gender
Age
Education
Income
Asian ancestry (Chinese, Japanese, Korean, other)
Latino ancestry (Central American, Mexican, other)
Nativity
Religion and social values
Religious affiliation
Church attendance
Political ideology
Personal, work, and neighborhood context
Any friend of the target racial group?
Coworkers mainly from target racial group?
Percent of target racial group in census tract
Interview context
Not same-race interviewer
Interviewer observations of the respondent

Source: authors' compilation.

versus foreign-born status as well as national ancestry may influence racial attitudes.

We also take into account the part that religion and social values may play in shaping racial attitudes. Some research suggests that there may be effects of religion on attitudes (for example, atheists often express liberal racial attitudes and individuals from more fundamentalist Protestant denominations more conservative views). In addition, those whose general political philosophy is liberal often express more tolerant racial attitudes than those who hold a more conservative political philosophy (Sears 1988; Sniderman and Piazza 1993).

Patterns of contact and interaction may also shape racial attitudes (Allport 1954; Jackman 1994). Individuals who have more diverse friendship networks, who work in more diverse environments, or who live in more diverse communities may, all else equal, be expected to express more liberal racial attitudes than those whose personal, work, and

neighborhood context are more homogeneous. Finally, as already noted, we routinely control for aspects of the interview context. Since not all interviews could be matched on the basis of race, we control for exposure to an interviewer of a different race than that of the respondent. We also control for several interviewer observations of respondent behavior during the course of answering the racial attitudes section of the questionnaire.

Our analysis follows a logical progression of likely relationships, as depicted in figure 3.1. We allow for the possibility that the elements of the respondents' social background characteristics, religion and social values, personal, work, and neighborhood context, and interview context will exert influence on each of the racial identity, attitude, and belief measures. At the same time, we operate on the assumption that there is a sort of logical order or sequencing—not necessarily causal or temporal—to the attitude measures themselves. Accordingly, we begin with the extent of feelings of common fate racial identity and next consider racial stereotypes. In effect, we are positing that the degree of in-group attachment and out-group differentiation are, at least logically, prior to perceptions of racial group competition or particular social policy views. The stronger the sense of group identity and the more negative the views of out-groups, the more likely we are to find acute levels of perceived racial group competition. Finally, the extent of opposition to affirmative action for minorities should reflect the feelings of group competition most proximately, but also be shaped by the degree of negative stereotyping and strength of group attachments.

The Contours of Racial Attitudes

Common Fate Identity

Sociologists have long regarded racial and ethnic background as a core source of the individual's social identity. As Kathryn O'Sullivan See and William Julius Wilson put it: "A fundamental question in the study of intergroup relations is how ethnic identity arises, persists, and is altered" (1989, 224). The categories to which individuals are socially recognized as belonging are typically held to influence larger self-conceptions and feelings of self-worth. Under some circumstances a racial or ethnic identity can become a "master status" (Anderson 1990). Social psychologists emphasize that identities can be important bases for social action as well. Henri Tajfel and John Turner (1979) argue that categorization per se, even in the absence of face-to-face interaction with fellow group members or any real social ties, can result in consequential



FIGURE 3.1 *Heuristic Model of Racial Attitude Analysis*

Source: authors' compilation.

social behavior favoring one's own group. We seek to determine the extent to which individuals see their own fate as bound up with that of the racial or ethnic group to which they belong and whether such identities are a product of the social background, values, and contextual influences impinging on the individual.

We used two steps to measure a sense of common fate racial identity. We first asked individuals, "Do you think what happens generally to [own racial group] people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?" For those respondents who answered positively, we then asked whether that racial group membership would "affect you a lot, some, or not very much." We are thus able to capture the intensity of feelings of common fate. Tajfel (1982) suggested that an assumption of common fate played a role in the pattern of in-group favoritism shown in his program of research on the impact of social categorization. Several studies have found that feelings of common fate are the most potent dimension of group consciousness among African Americans (Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989; Tate 1993; Dawson 1994). There is growing evidence of a sense of group identity and attachment among many Asian Americans as well (Espiritu 1992; Tuan 1999), and of important national ancestry attachments among Latinos (De la Garza, Falcon, and Garcia 1996).

Solid majorities—uniformly greater than two-thirds of white, black, Latino, and Asian respondents—expressed at least some degree of common fate racial identity. Figure 3.2 shows the results for the full four-category classification. There are highly significant racial group differences, with African Americans (40 percent) most likely to express "a lot" of common fate group identity. Whereas two out of five blacks express such a high level of common fate identity, only one out of four Latinos do so, and just one out of five whites and Asians do. Still, a nontrivial fraction of each group also denies that racial membership will have personal consequences, including 28 percent of Latinos and 27 percent of whites.

Table 3.2 reports mean scores on the common fate identity (1 = none, 4 = a lot) measured by race and by each of the independent variables. Among all groups there is a small but not monotonic trend for older respondents to express less sense of common fate identity. Although the effect of education emerges as significant only among African Americans, there is a trend for those with greater education, in particular for those with postgraduate training, to express higher levels of common fate identity. This is most clearly the case among African Americans, where those with postgraduate training have the single highest mean sense of common fate score (2.74). Among all groups we also find that self-identified political liberals tend to express higher

FIGURE 3.2 *Common Fate Identity by Race*



Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.

common fate identity than do self-identified conservatives. Only among Latinos is there a regular occurrence of significant relations between level of common fate identity and interview characteristics, with those interviewed by a Latino and those who had no objections to the racial attitude questions expressing higher levels of common fate identity than those interviewed by someone of another race or who did object.

Finally, national ancestry differences emerge among both Asians and Latinos. A weaker sense of common fate identity emerges among Chinese and Japanese ancestry respondents, as compared to Koreans and those from other Asian backgrounds. Among Latinos, those of Central American ancestry express a higher common fate identity than those of Mexican or other Hispanic origin. Both patterns imply that immigrants are taking the racial common fate identity question as an opportunity to express what is mainly a national ancestry or ethnic identity.

TABLE 3.2 *Mean Common Fate Identity by Independent Variables and Race*

	Whites	Blacks	Asians	Latinos
Social background				
Education				
< high school diploma	1.09	1.88***	1.28	1.69
High school diploma	1.50	1.73	1.73	1.41
Some college	1.51	2.05	1.69	1.51
Bachelor's degree	1.67	1.87	1.71	1.55
Postgraduate	1.78	2.74	1.78	1.64
Gender				
Female	1.63	1.97	1.49	1.59
Male	1.49	1.94	1.82	1.58
Age				
Twenty-one to twenty-nine years	1.26***	2.11***	1.89***	1.72***
Thirty to thirty-nine years	1.72	1.76	1.81	1.59
Forty to forty-nine years	1.60	2.20	1.85	1.55
Fifty plus years	1.57	1.83	1.29	1.34
Income report				
Reported	1.56	1.96	1.73	1.56
Did not report	1.51	1.93	1.44	1.72
Income				
Less than 20,000	1.32	1.78	1.75	1.62*
20 to 39,000	1.57	1.94	1.73	1.69
40 to 59,000	1.68	2.12	1.44	1.32
60,000+	1.57	2.17	1.98	1.12
Asian ancestry				
Chinese	—	—	1.54*	—
Japanese	—	—	1.40	—
Korean	—	—	1.86	—
Other	—	—	2.35	—
Latino ancestry				
Mexican	—	—	—	1.57**
Central American	—	—	—	1.85
Other	—	—	—	1.16
Nativity				
Foreign-born	—	—	1.68	1.68**
U.S. native	—	—	1.48	1.33
Religion and social values				
Religion				
Protestant	1.53	1.98	1.96**	1.51
Catholic	1.54	1.75	1.23	1.60
Jewish	1.79	—	—	—
Other	1.64	2.21	1.70	1.67
Agnostic or atheist	1.42	1.61	1.49	1.41

TABLE 3.2 *Continued*

	Whites	Blacks	Asians	Latinos
Political ideology				
Liberal	1.71**	2.17	1.90*	1.93***
Moderate or no thought	1.39	1.83	1.36	1.37
Conservative	1.58	1.75	1.74	1.58
Interview context				
Interviewer race				
Same as respondent	1.60	1.89	1.71	1.67**
Not same race	1.47	2.04	1.44	1.35
Pause				
No pausing	1.58	1.89	1.73	1.64
Paused	1.52	2.08	1.46	1.53
Justify				
No justifying	1.60	1.85**	1.67	1.54
Justified	1.43	2.30	1.50	1.78
Object				
Did not object	1.56	1.97	1.67	1.66**
Objected	1.53	1.61	1.45	1.23
Discomfort				
No discomfort	1.56	1.93	1.70*	1.62
Discomfort	1.54	2.18	1.07	1.42
Personal context				
Black friends				
None	1.55	1.83	1.66*	1.58
At least one	1.73	2.01	1.11	1.80
White friends				
None	1.33*	1.99	1.67	1.61
At least one	1.60	1.72	1.41	1.40
Asian friends				
None	1.57	1.92***	1.71	1.58
At least one	1.41	2.73	1.57	2.02
Latino friends				
None	1.56	1.93	1.66	1.47
At least one	1.54	2.34	1.50	1.67
Workplace context				
White coworkers				
Other	1.40*	1.96	1.63	1.56
Mainly white	1.65	1.94	1.73	1.74
Black coworkers				
Other	1.55	1.97	1.64	1.59
Mainly black	1.86	1.93	2.41	1.42

(Table continues on p. 98.)

TABLE 3.2 *Continued*

	Whites	Blacks	Asians	Latinos
Latino coworkers				
Other	1.56	1.95	1.65	1.44*
Mainly Latino	1.50	2.05	1.69	1.67
Asian coworkers				
Other	1.56	1.95	1.67	1.59
Mainly Asian	1.40	2.14	1.63	1.30
Neighborhood context				
Tract racial comp.				
<10 percent own race	.88*	2.00	1.59	.83**
10 to 19 percent own race	1.33	2.02	1.70	1.23
20+ percent own race	1.57	1.91	1.64	1.62

Source: Los Angeles Survey of Urban Inequality 1994.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

We also estimated full multivariate models of the determinants of common fate identity using ordinary least squares regression.[4] These results are reported separately by race in table 3.3. The first pattern to note is that overall the models are more successful among the racial minority respondents than for whites. (The model for whites yields a variance explained estimate of only .06 and the f-test for the full equation fails to reach conventional criteria for statistical discernibility.) That is, we cannot identify clear sources of individual variation in expression of common fate among whites.

The models are modestly more successful among blacks, Latinos, and Asians. Among African Americans we find an effect of education, with those who obtained postgraduate training scoring more than 1 point higher, net of all other variables in the model, than blacks at any other level of educational attainment. In addition, the model shows that two of the interview context variables had significant effects. Although the race of the interviewer was insignificant, those respondents rated as showing discomfort during the racial attitude section scored higher in common fate identity and those who objected to the racial attitude section scored lower.

Among the Asian respondents the level of expressed common fate identity was significantly tied to age, sex, income level, and aspects of the interview context. Younger respondents were more likely to express high common fate identity than were older respondents and women more so than men. Those of Korean ancestry expressed the highest level of common fate identity and those of Japanese ancestry the least.

TABLE 3.3 *Multivariate Models of Common Fate Identity*

	Whites	Blacks	Asians	Latinos
Constant	1.13 (.43)*	1.42 (.59)*	2.99 (.43)***	1.67 (.42)***
Social background				
Age	.00 (.00)	−.00 (.00)	−.02 (.00)**	−.01 (.00)**
Education				
No high school diploma	−.16 (.37)	.14 (.20)	−.26 (.27)	.28 (.11)
Some college	.02 (.14)	.16 (.13)	−.09 (.16)	.18 (.14)
Bachelor's degree	.19 (.14)	.08 (.19)	−.01 (.12)	.29 (.21)
Postgraduate	.23 (.18)	1.17 (.26)***	−.07 (.17)	.72 (.35)*
Gender	−.16 (.12)	−.11 (.13)	.34 (.11)**	−.03 (.11)
Income				
Did not report	.13 (.24)	.23 (.24)	−.63 (.14)***	.62 (.24)*
Low income	.00 (.23)	.02 (.23)	−.29 (.17)	.32 (.20)
Lower middle income	.09 (.17)	.20 (.22)	−.38 (.15)*	.45 (.17)*
Higher middle income	.13 (.14)	.34 (.20)	−.66 (.17)***	.20 (.24)
Not in work force	−.21 (.13)	−.00 (.15)	−.16 (.13)	.10 (.12)
Ancestry				
Korean	—	—	.39 (.18)*	—
Japanese	—	—	−.28 (.15)	—
Other Asian	—	—	.25 (.40)	—
Mexican	—	—	—	−.03 (.18)
Central American	—	—	—	.21 (.23)
U.S. native	—	—	.01 (.16)	−.10 (.15)
Religion and social values				
Protestant	.19 (.18)	.35 (.24)	.15 (.21)	.17 (.23)
Catholic	.20 (.18)	.14 (.29)	−.48 (.22)*	.14 (.19)
Jewish	.38 (.21)	—	—	—
Other religion	.35 (.19)	.49 (.37)	.23 (.12)	.43 (.29)
Church attendance	.00 (.03)	.02 (.04)	−.02 (.05)	−.02 (.03)
Political conservatism	−.04 (.03)	−.04 (.03)	.01 (.04)	−.08 (.04)*
Personal, work, and neighborhood context				
Has target group friend	.14 (.15)	.08 (.14)	−.10 (.11)	.24 (.10)*
Coworkers mainly target group	.17 (.13)	.05 (.13)	−.28 (.14)	.20 (.10)
Percentage target group in tract	−.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	−.00 (.00)	−.00 (.00)
Interview context				
Not same-race interviewer	−.04 (.13)	−.03 (.29)	−.06 (.19)	−.30 (.13)*

(Table continues on p. 100.)

TABLE 3.3 *Continued*

	Whites	Blacks	Asians	Latinos
Paused before answering	−.08 (.12)	.23 (.12)	−.17 (.09)	−.22 (.11)*
Justified responses	−.19 (.12)	.17 (.11)	−.06 (.14)	.39 (.15)**
Showed discomfort	.05 (.15)	.35 (.15)*	−.37 (.25)	−.14 (.13)
Objected to section	.09 (.24)	−.63 (.23)**	.09 (.14)	−.66 (.16)**
R^2	.06	.11**	.27***	.14***
N	720	1061	1011	968

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
Note: Omitted categories for income, education, and religion are high-income, high school diploma, and agnostic or atheist, respectively. For the ancestry items, Chinese ancestry and other Latino ancestry were omitted.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

High-income Asian respondents tended to express higher levels of common fate identity.

For Latino respondents common fate identity was significantly related to age, education, income, political ideology, personal network composition, and several interview characteristic measures. Older respondents express less common fate identity than do younger respondents. Again, those with the very highest level of education are the most likely to express a sense of common fate identity. In contrast to the pattern observed among Asians, for Latinos it is lower-income individuals (and those who refused to report their income) who express higher levels of common fate identity. Politically conservative Latinos are less likely to express common fate identity than are political liberals.

Most striking is the number of interview context measures that influenced how Latinos responded to the common fate identity question. Those interviewed by a non-Latino, who paused during the racial section, who appeared uncomfortable with race questions, or who objected to the section express lower levels of common fate identity. In contrast, those whom interviewers rated as trying to "justify" their answers expressed higher levels of common fate identity than those who did not offer justifications. To us this implies that the idea of expressing a sense of *racial* common fate identity did not resonate with a goodly number of Latino respondents. This is not to say that such an identity has no meaning for Latino respondents, since in other ways—the effects of higher education, of age, and of political ideology—the results are all quite sensible. Rather, it suggests that common fate racial identity may not be the first nor even a highly salient group identity among Latinos.

National ancestry or a more distinctly ethnic attachment presumably takes a higher priority.

In sum, the vast majority of adults in Los Angeles County express some degree of common fate racial identity. This tendency is most pronounced among African Americans. Our results suggest not only racial group differences in the levels of common fate identity, but differences in the meaning and salience of such an identity as well. For white respondents, common fate identity does not appear to be strongly differentiated on the basis of individual characteristics. At least, there are no systematic sources of individual variation that we can detect. For African Americans and for Asians, the notion of a common racial fate does seem more firmly grounded in individual experiences. And as just noted, among Latinos there is some inclination to resist expression of a sense of common fate racial identity, but the notion clearly has some underlying patterning and roots for them.

Racial Stereotypes

What individuals think and believe about the members of other racial and ethnic groups—stereotypes—are commonly recognized as a critical factor in intergroup relations (Allport 1954; Ashmore and Del Boca 1981; Stephan 1985; Jackman 1994). The LASUI contained a large battery of 1- to 7-point bipolar trait rating items based on the model of the 1990 General Social Survey (see Smith 1991; Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Bobo and Kluegel 1997). The trait dimensions were: rich-poor, unintelligent-intelligent, prefer to be self-supporting–prefer to live off welfare, hard to get along with–easy to get along with, speak English poorly–speak English well, involved in drugs and gangs–not involved in drugs and gangs, tend to discriminate against members of other groups–tend to treat members of other groups equally. This set of traits reflects a mix of considerations. Some speak to core concerns in an achievement-oriented society as well as core elements of racial ideologies in the United States (that is, level of intelligence, welfare dependency). Other traits are included because they speak to potentially distinctive views of particular groups. For example, some segments of the Asian population (such as Korean store owners) have been stereotyped as brusque and difficult in social interaction (hard to get along with). And some traits seem to distinguish how racial minorities tend to view whites (such as tending to discriminate against others). This set of items was strongly suggested by our earlier multiethnic focus group discussions (Bobo et al. 1994 and 1995).

Are views of groups consensual or disputed? Are they extreme and categorical, or small and domain-specific? Does one group stand out as

the subject of unusually negative stereotyping? In general, we should find a degree of consensus to stereotypes, since they tend to reflect the relative positioning of groups in the social structure (Eagly and Steffen 1984; Sigelman, Shockey and Sigelman 1993; Jackman 1994). However, some groups, due to historical experience or group resources and tradition, may be more effectively poised to challenge potentially negative perceptions of them than are members of other groups (Jackman and Senter 1983).

The racial stereotyping questions were asked as part of a three-way survey-based experiment (compare Schuman and Bobo 1988). This "split-ballot" experiment involved a manipulation wherein a randomly selected third of respondents were asked questions referring to broad racial and ethnic categories ("whites," "blacks," "Asians," or "Latinos"), a third were asked questions referring to males of each racial group, and a third were asked questions referring to females of each racial group. The basic distribution of responses for each item by race and by ballot are shown in table 3.4.

Two types of scores may be examined: absolute ratings in response to each question and a stereotype difference score (scores for any particular target group subtracted from those for the respondent's rating of his or her membership group). The difference scores provide a clearer depiction of whether other groups are seen as essentially no different from the in-group, superior to the in-group, or inferior to the in-group. For greater ease of interpretations we have rescored the absolute ratings so that they run from 0 to 50, with higher scores reflecting more negative ratings. The difference scores range from a low of −50 (most inferior in-group rating compared to out-group) to high of +50 (most superior in-group rating compared to out-group rating). A score of 25 is thus the midpoint, signaling moderate scores on the absolute rating scale, and a score of 0 indicates no perceived group difference for the difference score scale. For ease of interpretation, then, all else equal, the higher the score the more negative the stereotype rating.

Perceived Economic Status Differences We begin with how respondents rated groups on the rich or poor trait dimension, and for now restrict our attention only to the one-third of the sample asked the general racial group category version of the questions (the first column and first row of each racial group block of figures in table 3.4). The results for the absolute ratings of each target group by race of respondent are shown in figure 3.3.

First, on average, all groups recognize some important racial group differences in economic standing. All respondents rate whites as the most affluent (lowest score), with no score exceeding 20 on a 50-point

scale, and reaching lows (perception of greater affluence) of 16.25 among Latinos and of 13.02 among blacks. Whites see little difference economically between themselves as a group and Asians as a group, but Asians clearly perceive whites as slightly more affluent than themselves. On the whole, however, Asians are generally seen as close to whites in overall economic standing. Blacks and Latinos are uniformly seen as the most economically disadvantaged. Whites, Asians, and Latinos see Latinos as slightly more disadvantaged than blacks, whereas blacks see themselves as more disadvantaged than Latinos.

These results have important implications. First, it is evident that most adults in Los Angeles County recognize important racial group differences in economic standing. Second, the perception of differences is, by and large, a matter of mutual social recognition. We do not find sharp disagreement (the only exception is how blacks see themselves relative to Latinos) in the perception of group economic standing.

Group Self-Images We next consider how members of each group rated their own group on each of the personality or dispositional traits (intelligence, welfare, drugs and gangs, ability to get along with, tendency to discriminate, English). Among the six personality traits, only one rating tilts in the direction of an unfavorable self-rating among whites and that is on the "tends to discriminate against others" dimension (28.28). All the other absolute in-group ratings are less than 20 and some, like the "ability to speak English well" trait, are quite favorable (8.17). Whites give themselves, on average, the lowest (most favorable) overall stereotype rating (see figure 3.4).

Blacks give themselves ratings that tilt in an unfavorable direction (exceed 25 points) on the traits of welfare dependency and involvement with drugs and gangs, the latter being more extreme (30.96). The most favorable in-group rating among blacks emerges for English language ability (13.84) and the ability to get along with others (17.65).

For Latinos three of the dimensions tilt in the direction of negative in-group ratings: involvement with drugs and gangs (32.34), poor English ability (29.23), and welfare dependency (27.73). The most favorable in-group rating among Latinos is the ability to get along with others (14.75).

Among the Asian respondents we find that only one dimension, the tendency to discriminate against others, has an in-group rating that tilts in a negative direction (25.48), and even this just barely clears the midpoint of 25. The most favorable in-group rating occurs on the welfare dependency item (9.11), followed by intelligence (15.39).

Perceptions of Other Groups Figure 3.4 shows the average absolute stereotype score rating across the six personality dimensions (excluding

TABLE 3.4 *Mean Stereotype Ratings by Race and Target Group*

	Target Groups							
	All Whites	White Men	White Women	F	All Blacks	Black Men	Black Women	F
White respondents								
Rich-poor	19.47	19.34	25.81	45.12***	33.93	34.05	36.25	4.96**
Unintelligent	17.64	17.65	16.30	1.18	24.75	24.72	22.05	3.95*
Prefer welfare	11.95	10.32	13.50	4.69**	28.03	25.33	27.82	1.51
Hard to get along	17.64	18.36	18.71	.27	24.18	23.72	22.27	1.30
Poor English	8.17	9.21	6.19	6.20**	20.98	21.74	18.12	3.56*
Drugs-gangs	19.11	19.60	12.65	17.80***	34.70	30.49	26.68	16.07***
Discriminate	28.28	27.09	21.39	10.37***	33.20	31.57	28.38	6.05**
Absolute scale	17.20	16.96	14.77	5.35**	27.57	26.36	24.34	7.88***
Difference score	—	—	—	—	8.19	7.77	7.50	.35
SES difference	—	—	—	—	14.51	14.79	10.50	13.85***
Black respondents								
Rich-poor	13.02	16.84	18.79	7.13***	34.37	33.55	32.86	.39
Unintelligent	22.49	18.32	19.35	2.23	21.68	18.72	18.69	2.82
Prefer welfare	16.61	15.00	16.75	.49	26.79	24.72	23.63	1.22
Hard to get along	27.09	24.51	21.80	3.53*	17.65	18.60	16.59	.51
Poor English	8.33	8.22	7.82	.09	13.84	16.86	13.39	1.24
Drugs-gangs	27.07	27.06	20.13	10.45***	30.96	32.86	25.62	5.96**
Discriminate	38.37	34.41	33.23	6.02**	24.91	26.15	22.67	2.43
Absolute scale	23.50	21.31	19.77	10.11***	23.69	23.04	20.09	7.02***
Difference score	.56	−.87	.46	.97	—	—	—	—
SES difference	−21.33	−16.72	−14.02	3.81*	—	—	—	—
Asian respondents								
Rich-poor	16.78	16.85	16.47	.02	36.25	35.00	37.22	1.22
Unintelligent	17.70	18.97	15.97	.92	28.30	28.64	27.03	.28
Prefer welfare	11.57	15.59	14.74	3.00*	32.18	35.33	34.08	.83
Hard to get along	20.75	22.24	25.74	2.37	23.30	28.92	28.05	2.75
Poor English	3.85	4.06	2.05	2.79	9.71	9.54	8.77	.12
Drug-gangs	19.72	20.94	18.49	.49	34.78	33.91	31.45	1.97
Discriminate	32.71	27.88	31.80	2.85	27.87	25.10	29.44	3.02*
Absolute scale	17.81	18.83	18.48	.31	25.95	26.86	26.82	.27
Difference score	−.29	1.54	1.32	1.84	5.68	8.04	7.48	2.09
SES difference	−4.34	−3.21	−6.38	1.06	14.94	14.90	14.50	.03
Latino respondents								
Rich-poor	12.35	12.23	15.11	3.09*	34.16	31.77	33.36	2.26
Unintelligent	17.51	15.97	17.29	.55	24.67	24.30	24.04	.18
Prefer welfare	14.29	16.71	16.71	1.68	36.65	36.94	37.46	.14
Hard to get along	22.02	22.15	21.04	.27	27.64	26.85	27.90	.24
Poor English	5.59	4.45	3.15	2.16	16.01	13.64	14.64	.85
Drugs-gangs	21.82	22.13	20.00	.92	35.80	36.91	35.03	.84
Discriminate	33.06	33.72	31.52	.82	33.80	33.14	31.65	.83
Absolute scale	19.14	19.20	18.37	.72	29.30	28.49	28.17	1.22
Difference score	−4.36	−3.88	−3.32	.52	3.78	3.32	4.21	.97
SES difference	−24.12	−23.12	−19.84	2.76	−2.30	−3.65	−1.86	1.28

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
Note: Higher scores indicate more negative out-group ratings.
*p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001

the rich-poor dimension) by race and target group. It shows clearly that members of all racial groups perceive some degree of difference on these traits among and between racial groups, though none of the perceived differences are gaping or categorical. Among whites, the overall scores

	Target Groups							
All Latinos	Latino Men	Latina Women	F	All Asians	Asian Men	Asian Women	F
36.01	35.03	38.09	3.76*	19.60	20.08	25.12	22.75***
25.84	25.02	24.38	.76	15.33	15.92	15.49	.10
25.49	23.54	26.19	1.47	10.25	9.00	12.59	5.78**
21.52	22.03	21.57	.10	23.25	21.87	21.22	.75
31.73	31.33	30.93	.17	24.26	23.98	23.64	.10
33.99	29.13	26.70	14.76***	21.60	20.68	12.33	35.37***
29.70	28.91	26.54	3.30*	29.08	29.87	24.70	8.11***
27.88	26.78	26.31	1.71	20.61	20.18	18.02	6.14**
8.51	8.39	9.35	.78	3.05	3.06	3.32	.16
16.60	15.73	12.34	8.53***	.13	.89	−.55	1.10
26.22	34.49	34.35	.52	16.25	17.67	20.91	4.31**
25.51	23.59	22.62	1.81	21.34	17.02	19.09	2.06
27.03	27.27	26.07	.12	14.89	14.14	14.91	.10
21.09	21.21	17.06	2.79	31.75	28.48	23.83	5.02**
33.99	30.78	30.19	1.15	34.75	30.96	28.87	3.28*
31.04	32.56	27.45	2.86	26.46	27.99	18.96	13.36***
28.68	29.17	26.47	1.94	37.03	33.62	33.33	2.46
28.91	27.46	24.93	4.39**	27.95	25.44	22.99	14.18***
5.13	4.46	4.49	.26	5.36	3.15	3.82	1.95
1.86	.95	1.32	.27	−18.03	−15.89	−12.02	3.17*
37.69	36.21	38.46	1.07	21.23	20.14	22.76	1.39
28.95	30.00	27.91	.30	15.39	14.26	15.70	.67
32.18	35.62	33.16	.68	9.11	11.44	11.04	1.82
20.85	22.16	24.02	1.07	17.34	13.50	16.79	2.25
30.78	29.75	26.40	3.42*	21.82	22.44	20.92	.49
33.44	31.37	28.30	4.52**	16.13	13.07	11.85	1.75
23.66	19.76	23.09	2.41	25.48	19.78	22.09	2.54
28.39	28.04	27.33	.36	17.50	15.77	16.12	1.47
8.34	9.64	8.89	.70	—	—	—	—
16.47	16.05	15.55	.10	—	—	—	—
36.46	35.42	35.08	.68	17.58	14.90	17.39	2.36
22.84	21.31	21.23	1.17	16.35	14.64	14.57	.88
27.73	28.30	27.94	.07	13.65	16.43	14.85	2.19
14.75	15.59	12.71	2.02	25.70	27.41	24.82	1.40
29.23	27.88	27.92	.79	26.58	26.13	24.31	1.24
32.34	33.67	27.70	10.24***	21.24	21.59	16.06	7.80***
22.41	23.35	19.37	3.07*	29.13	30.77	29.00	.71
24.94	24.75	22.87	6.02**	22.07	22.64	20.65	4.23*
—	—	—	—	−1.27	−.50	−.53	.58
—	—	—	—	−18.89	−20.54	−17.35	1.88

for both blacks (25.95) and Latinos (28.39) exhibit a slight negative tilt. Among black respondents there is a similar slight overall negative tilt to their views of Asians (27.95) and Latinos (28.91). Latino respondents give the single highest negative absolute score for an out-group to blacks (29.30), but otherwise do not clearly swing in a negative direction for

FIGURE 3.3 *Perceived Socioeconomic Standing*



Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.

assessments of any other group. And Asian respondents give slightly negative overall ratings to Latinos (25.95) and to blacks (28.39).

It is worth commenting on the components of these ratings and what they may tell us about consensual or common stereotypical images. The only trait on which all three racial minorities tended to rate whites unfavorably was the tendency to discriminate against others, as expected. Otherwise, ratings of whites tilted in a neutral to favorable direction. There is quite a different story with regard to perceptions of blacks. Whites, Latinos, and Asians tended to have unfavorable ratings of blacks on the dimensions of welfare dependency, involvement with drugs and gangs, and the tendency to discriminate against others.

There is a tendency for whites, blacks, and Asians to give Latinos unfavorable ratings on the dimensions of drugs and gangs and English language ability. In addition, whites and blacks both give Latinos unfavorable ratings on the average with regard to discriminating against others. Blacks and Asians give Latinos unfavorable ratings on the welfare dependency dimension.

The clearest unfavorable rating that others give to Asians occurs on the tendency to discriminate against others, with whites, blacks, and

FIGURE 3.4 *Overall Stereotype Index Ratings by Race*



Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.

Latinos giving an overall unfavorable rating. In addition, both blacks and Latinos also rate Asians unfavorably on the English language ability and hard to get along with dimensions.

So far we have restricted our attention to the absolute ratings for individual dimensions and overall scores. There is also important information to be gleaned from examining difference score ratings. Figure 3.5 shows the overall difference score rating by respondent race and target group race. These scores may range from +50 (maximum possible superior rating of in-group) to −50 (maximum possible inferior rating of in-group). Four rather group-specific patterns stand out. First, whites clearly rate themselves as superior, on average, as compared to each of the racial minorities. All the scores are positive and usually exceed 3 points (on a 100-point scale). The consistency and size of the differentiation from other groups by whites is not matched by that of any other group.

Given the history of friction and negative exchanges between blacks and whites, especially in the wake of the riots of 1992 in Los Angeles, it was somewhat surprising that whites' ratings of Latinos were slightly more unfavorable than those given blacks. The scores might be unduly influenced by the negative perception whites have of Latinos' English language ability, due to their recent immigrant status. That is, whereas

FIGURE 3.5 *Stereotype Difference Score Ratings by Race*



Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.

poor English ratings of blacks probably imply persistent failure to master the dominant English language dialect (white middle-class speech patterns), as a result of recent heavy immigration a similar rating would not imply the same degree of dispositional character for Latinos. Hence, we recalculated whites' overall difference score, omitting the English item; figure 3.6 shows these results. Here, the rating of blacks (7.30) is less favorable than that given Latinos (5.58), and the perceived difference from Asians vanishes almost entirely.

Second, black respondents essentially see themselves as no different from whites, on average. However, blacks give themselves superior ratings compared to both Asians and Latinos. Third, a somewhat complementary pattern obtains among Asians. Overall for this set of dimensions, Asians see little difference between themselves and whites, but clearly rate themselves as superior to blacks and (especially) Latinos.

Fourth, Latinos' scores are striking for the presence of a clear inferior group self-rating relative to whites and modestly negative group self-rating relative to Asians. However, Latinos rate themselves as superior to blacks on average. We were struck by these negative in-group ratings among Latinos and sought to determine whether they occurred mainly among those of a particular national ancestry or more among the

FIGURE 3.6 *Whites' Stereotype Difference Scores (Omitting English Language Ability)*



Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.

foreign-born as compared to the native-born. We found that the negative or inferior in-group rating tends to occur among Latinos irrespective of national ancestry. And, with respect to the difference from whites, the negative score occurs of roughly comparable magnitude among both the native- and foreign-born. However, the negative rating relative to Asians is mainly restricted to the foreign-born. Omitting the English language item from the index does considerably mute the size of the favorable out-group advantage among Latinos, but does not eliminate or reverse it.

We also estimated multivariate models of the determinants of stereotypes. Among white respondents, negative stereotypes of blacks rose with age, political conservatism, and perceptions of black economic disadvantage. Stereotypes of blacks were more favorable among white women as compared to white men, and among those with a black person in their personal network or who lived around more blacks compared to those lacking such contact. Whites' stereotypes of Latinos were more negative among men as compared to women, for those who perceived Latinos as lagging behind whites economically, and among those whites who had many Latino coworkers. However, white stereotypes of Latinos tended to become more favorable among those with a Latino

friend (borderline, p = .055) and those who lived in a tract with a higher percentage of Latinos. Whites' views of Asians were not clearly tied to any of the variables we examined, with the model yielding a variance-explained estimate of only .05 (not significant). This contrasts to the variance-explained figures of .21 for whites' views of blacks and .19 for whites' views of Latinos. Perceptions of common fate identity had no discernible effect on any of whites' stereotype ratings of other groups. (See tables 3.5 through 3.8.)

Several variables consistently influence the extent of negative stereotyping among blacks. Whether the target group was whites, Latinos, or Asians, our results show that older blacks express less negative stereotypes than do younger blacks, that black respondents whom interviewers rated as "pausing" during the racial attitude section expressed more negative stereotypes than those who did not pause, and those blacks not currently in the labor force expressed more negative stereotypes than those in the labor force. There was also a tendency for other contextual variables to influence the proclivity to stereotype among blacks. Thus, blacks who had a white friend expressed more favorable views of whites. Yet those blacks with workplace contact with Asians expressed more negative views, whereas those with neighborhood contact expressed more favorable views of Asians. In addition, the more blacks perceived Latinos as economically disadvantaged, the more negative the stereotype rating. More politically conservative blacks also give Latinos more negative ratings.

Among Asians, national ancestry influenced stereotype perceptions of both whites and blacks but not Latinos. Korean, Japanese (especially), and Chinese respondents as compared to those of other Asian ancestry gave more favorable ratings to whites. A roughly similar pattern emerged in terms of ratings of blacks, though in this case respondents of Chinese ancestry gave the most favorable rating. In addition, the greater the perceived economic status gap, the more negative Asian respondents' views of whites, Latinos, and blacks. Better-educated Asians, especially those with postgraduate schooling, expressed more favorable stereotypes of all groups. Asian respondents interviewed by a non-Asian gave more favorable ratings to both blacks and Latinos than those interviewed by someone of the same race. Whereas stereotypes became less favorable as the percentage of blacks in an Asian respondent's tract rose, stereotype scores toward Latinos became more favorable as the percentage of Latinos in the tract rose. A sense of common fate identity never significantly influenced stereotype views among Asian respondents.

Latino respondents provide the one instance in which perceptions of common fate identity consistently related to stereotype ratings. The higher the level of common fate identity among Latinos, the more

TABLE 3.5 *Multivariate Models of Stereotype Difference Score, White Respondents*

	White-Black Stereotype Difference Score	White-Asian Stereotype Difference Score	White-Latino Stereotype Difference Score
Constant	−3.51 (2.51)	1.07 (2.13)	1.93 (2.49)
Experimental ballot			
Male ballot	−.38 (.73)	−.04 (.53)	−.43 (.73)
Female ballot	−.29 (.79)	.54 (.60)	.83 (.88)
Social background			
Age	.08 (.03)**	−.01 (.02)	.04 (.03)
Education			
No high school diploma	−1.22 (1.28)	1.55 (1.28)	−1.31 (1.61)
Some college	.62 (.90)	−.09 (.61)	.41 (.87)
Bachelor's degree	−.81 (1.17)	.17 (.76)	.17 (1.13)
Postgraduate	−1.79 (1.24)	−1.00 (.98)	−2.28 (1.27)
Gender	−1.38 (.68)*	.38 (.50)	−2.85 (.65)***
Income			
Did not report	1.57 (1.31)	1.88 (1.04)	2.58 (1.26)*
Low income	1.26 (1.05)	1.12 (.91)	2.26 (1.16)*
Lower middle income	.02 (.98)	.18 (.88)	.80 (.91)
Higher middle income	.45 (.89)	.25 (.83)	1.38 (.85)
Not in work force	−.23 (.79)	.79 (.66)	−.17 (.83)
Religion and social values			
Protestant	.46 (1.55)	.78 (.93)	1.68 (1.49)
Catholic	1.71 (1.50)	.76 (.98)	1.65 (1.54)
Jewish	3.41 (1.94)	.60 (1.09)	3.36 (1.81)
Other religion	−.18 (1.87)	1.25 (1.28)	.47 (1.83)
Attend	.28 (.20)	.13 (.19)	.18 (.18)
Political conservatism	1.33 (.28)***	.05 (.20)	.80 (.26)**
Personal work, and neighborhood context			
Has target group friend	−2.71 (1.24)*	−.08 (.86)	−1.21 (.79)
Coworkers mainly target group	3.43 (2.24)	−.60 (1.56)	4.06 (1.30)**
Percentage target group in tract	−.09 (.03)***	−.02 (.03)	−.06 (.02)**
Interview context			
Not same race interviewer	−.92 (.64)	−.56 (.66)	−.59 (.68)
Paused before answering	.19 (.98)	.38 (.64)	−.04 (.97)
Justified responses	.13 (1.13)	.12 (.75)	.17 (1.11)

(Table continues on p. 112.)

TABLE 3.5 *Continued*

	White-Black Stereotype Difference Score	White-Asian Stereotype Difference Score	White-Latino Stereotype Difference Score
Showed discomfort	−2.27 (1.21)	−1.57 (.79)*	−2.78 (1.14)*
Objected to section	2.17 (2.07)	.11 (1.57)	.49 (2.38)
Racial attitudes			
Common fate	.27 (.25)	.21 (.24)	−.07 (.33)
SES difference score	.13 (.04)***	.04 (.04)	.11 (.03)***
R^2	.21***	.05	.19***
N	761	740	757

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
Note: Omitted categories for income, education and religon are high income, high school diploma, and agnostic or atheist, respectively.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

negative the stereotypes of whites, blacks, and Asians. (Somewhat consistent with our earlier discussion, those Latinos who identified strongly as a racial group appeared to do so in part in contradistinction from other groups.) Otherwise, among Latinos the significant predictors of stereotype scores were target group–specific. Latinas have more negative views of whites than do Latino men. Being interviewed by a non-Latino also resulted in a more favorable rating of whites. Surprisingly, better-educated Latinos expressed strongly negative views of blacks (a difference of 4.4 points between those with postgraduate degrees and those with only a high school diploma). Having a black friend in one's network or being interviewed by a non-Latino resulted in more favorable ratings of blacks. Native-born Latinos expressed more negative views of Asians, as did politically liberal Latinos. But, again, being interviewed by a non-Latino resulted in more favorable ratings of Asians.

The Gendering of Stereotypes Men typically face different expectations and experiences in the workforce than do women (Reskin, McBrier, and Kmec 1999). In particular, there is growing concern that black women are perceived more favorably by many potential employers than are black men (Holzer 1996; Wilson 1996). But also, even in the housing market, men are often differently positioned than women, with the latter more often perceived as lacking the resources, being burdened by children, or somehow less responsible for important household decisions than men, in the case of married couples. For these and other reasons the LASUI stereotype items included an experimental test of the

TABLE 3.6 *Multivariate Models of Stereotype Difference Score, Black Respondents*

	Black-White Stereotype Difference Score	Black-Asian Stereotype Difference Score	Black-Latino Stereotype Difference Score
Constant	3.16 (2.95)	7.67 (2.40)**	6.80 (1.98)***
Experimental ballot			
Male ballot	−1.83 (.98)	−2.09 (.87)*	−.41 (.78)
Female ballot	.06 (.95)	−1.17 (.95)	−.68 (.65)
Social background			
Age	−.07 (.03)*	−.10 (.02)***	−.08 (.02)***
Education			
No high school diploma	−2.07 (1.11)	−1.06 (1.19)	−.57 (.94)
Some college	−.60 (.94)	−.90 (.96)	−.37 (.67)
Bachelor's degree	1.13 (1.66)	−1.66 (1.25)	.05 (1.29)
Postgraduate	4.19 (2.15)*	1.86 (1.87)	−.95 (1.14)
Gender	1.38 (.85)	2.24 (.73)**	1.29 (.68)
Income			
Did not report	.07 (1.59)	−.55 (1.37)	−1.37 (1.12)
Low income	.30 (1.35)	.54 (.96)	1.15 (1.32)
Lower middle income	1.09 (1.42)	.74 (1.10)	.62 (1.09)
Higher middle income	.19 (1.42)	1.44 (1.48)	1.02 (1.26)
Not in work force	2.29 (.93)*	1.92 (.74)**	2.01 (.76)**
Religion and social values			
Protestant	−2.39 (1.55)	−1.75 (1.20)	−.77 (1.04)
Catholic	−2.89 (1.69)	−.80 (1.33)	−2.65 (1.21)*
Other religion	−.88 (2.15)	−1.80 (1.32)	−2.08 (1.25)
Attend	.07 (.20)	−.37 (.22)	−.07 (.15)
Political conservatism	.01 (.26)	.41 (.26)	.36 (.16)*
Personal, work, and neighborhood context			
Has target group friend	−3.44 (1.48)*	.00 (2.46)	−1.50 (1.25)
Coworkers mainly target group	.83 (.96)	4.39 (1.94)*	−.80 (.75)
Percentage target group in tract	−.03 (.03)	−.21 (.06)***	.00 (.02)
Interview context			
Not same-race interviewer	.49 (1.17)	1.60 (1.25)	−1.84 (.91)*

(Table continues on p. 114.)

TABLE 3.6 *Continued*

	Black-White Stereotype Difference Score	Black-Asian Stereotype Difference Score	Black-Latino Stereotype Difference Score
Paused before answering	1.99 (.90)*	2.06 (.72)**	1.23 (.66)
Justified responses	.19 (1.09)	1.08 (.77)	.91 (.65)
Showed discomfort	1.82 (1.47)	−.83 (1.20)	−.34 (1.07)
Objected to section	−5.60 (1.63)***	−2.95 (1.96)	−1.50 (1.34)
Racial attitudes			
Common fate	.38 (.36)	.53 (.33)	.17 (.33)
SES difference score	.01 (.03)	−.02 (.02)	.08 (.04)*
R^2	.14***	.16***	.16***
N	1037	999	1031

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
Note: Omitted categories for income, education, and religion are high income, high school diploma, and agnostic or atheist, respectively.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

impact of gender on racial stereotypes. The experiment suggests that gender definitely matters, but the perceived differences are often trait- and group-specific. The only broadly consistent patterns across race and racial target groups are the perception of women as less affluent than men and for men to be seen as more likely to engage in aggressive behaviors concerning involvement in drugs and gangs or exhibiting a tendency to discriminate against others. It should be stressed, however, that even these patterns do not appear with complete uniformity.

We begin this assessment by returning to the matter of group self-images in light of the gender experiment. Among white respondents we find significant experimental effects for five of the seven trait dimensions (see table 3.4). Among whites, men were seen as more difficult to get along with, as more likely to discriminate against others, as more likely to be involved in drugs and gangs, as more affluent and less likely to be on welfare as compared to women. We found no significant gender manipulation effect for the traits of intelligence or English language ability.

Among blacks rating themselves, only one significant gender difference emerged: men were rated as more likely to be involved in drugs and gangs than women. Among Latinos only two of the gender manipulations result in significant differences: men were seen as more involved in drugs and gangs than women and as more likely to discriminate

TABLE 3.7 *Multivariate Models of Stereotype Difference Score, Asian Respondents*

	Asian-White Stereotype Difference Score	Asian-Black Stereotype Difference Score	Asian-Latino Stereotype Difference Score
Constant	10.77 (3.03)***	7.37 (3.01)*	11.52 (2.45)***
Experimental ballot			
Male ballot	1.89 (.83)*	1.94 (.88)*	1.16 (.64)
Female ballot	2.06 (.84)*	1.74 (.73)*	.72 (.57)
Social background			
Age	−.03 (.02)	.00 (.03)	.02 (.02)
Education			
No high school diploma	.36 (1.01)	−.87 (.96)	.33 (.85)
Some college	−2.50 (1.19)*	−.37 (1.12)	−.66 (.92)
Bachelor's degree	−.93 (1.05)	−.95 (.79)	−.64 (.64)
Postgraduate	−2.79 (1.47)	−1.77 (.81)	−3.24 (.75)***
Gender	.96 (.61)	.43 (.63)*	.14 (.51)
Income			
Did not report	.83 (.93)	−.76 (1.07)	.06 (.85)
Low income	−.82 (.99)	−1.75 (1.28)	−.14 (.81)
Lower middle income	.46 (1.13)	.69 (1.02)	.87 (.85)
Higher middle income	−.94 (1.41)	1.89 (1.03)	1.11 (.76)
Not in work force	−1.33 (.84)	.41 (.70)	.01 (.52)
Ancestry			
Chinese	−5.34 (1.99)**	−3.73 (1.77)*	−.62 (1.12)
Japanese	−6.26 (2.37)**	−3.24 (1.64)*	−.73 (1.50)
Korean	−4.93 (2.12)*	−1.99 (1.88)	.74 (1.41)
U.S. native	.30 (1.18)	.26 (1.66)	−.78 (1.21)
Religion and social values			
Protestant	−1.99 (1.01)*	−1.33 (1.39)	−1.62 (1.07)
Catholic	−3.62 (1.29)**	−3.74 (1.82)*	−4.04 (1.27)**
Other religion	−1.30 (.75)	−1.20 (.94)	−.60 (.67)
Attend	−.29 (.24)	.03 (.31)	−.41 (.22)
Political conservatism	.22 (.24)	.34 (.27)	.06 (.20)
Personal, work, neighborhood context			
Has target group friend	−1.21 (.91)	−2.17 (2.09)	3.24 (1.27)**
Coworkers mainly target group	.35 (1.10)	−1.18 (1.90)	−.74 (.87)
Percentage target group in tract	−.02 (.02)	.13 (.07)	−.06 (.02)***

(Table continues on p. 116.)

TABLE 3.7 *Continued*

	Asian-White Stereotype Difference Score	Asian-Black Stereotype Difference Score	Asian-Latino Stereotype Difference Score
Interview context			
Not same-race interviewer	−.08 (.92)	−1.98 (.89)*	−2.46 (.68)***
Paused before answering	−.88 (.80)	−1.09 (.86)	−.41 (.63)
Justified responses	.13 (1.14)	−1.19 (1.06)	.07 (.56)
Showed discomfort	1.27 (1.21)	−1.01 (1.15)	−1.31 (.87)
Objected to section	−2.70 (1.00)**	−1.91 (.87)*	−.88 (.57)
Racial attitudes			
Common fate	−.16 (.34)	−.06 (.32)	−.06 (.25)
SES difference score	.08 (.03)**	.12 (.04)**	.10 (.03)***
R^2	.20***	.23***	.30***
N	712	723	721

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
Note: Omitted categories for income, education, and religion are high income, high school diploma, and agnostic or atheist, respectively.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

against others. And among Asians none of the trait dimensions showed a significant effect for the gender manipulations.

What about out-group views? White respondents did differentiate between black males and females on several dimensions. Whites saw black men as less intelligent, having a poorer command of the English language, and more involved with drugs and gangs than black women. But black women were seen as less affluent than black men. Surprisingly, whites did not see black women as more welfare-dependent. This may imply that the large number of jobless black men is roughly equated with welfare dependency among women. Among Latino and Asian respondents we found no significant effects of the gender manipulation in terms of ratings of blacks.

White respondents rated Latino men as significantly more likely to be involved in drugs and gangs and as more likely to discriminate against others than Latinas. Latinas were rated by whites as poorer than Latino men. Among black respondents we found no significant differences based on the gender manipulation. However, Asian respondents saw Latino men as having a poorer command of English and as being more involved in drugs and gangs than Latinas.

In terms of ratings of Asians, among white respondents Asian males

TABLE 3.8 *Multivariate Models of Stereotype Difference Scores, Latino Respondents*

	Latino-White Stereotype Difference Score	Latino-Black Stereotype Difference Score	Latino-Asian Stereotype Difference Score
Constant	−5.10 (3.24)	6.13 (1.93)**	−1.49 (2.58)
Experimental ballot			
Male ballot	.11 (.98)	−.37 (.69)	.36 (.77)
Female ballot	.37 (.99)	.05 (.59)	.30 (.81)
Social background			
Age	.01 (.03)	−.02 (.02)	.01 (.02)
Education			
No high school diploma	−1.41 (.88)	−.32 (.65)	.82 (.88)
Some college	−1.19 (1.20)	.13 (.80)	.57 (1.06)
Bachelor's degree	1.33 (1.38)	.33 (.93)	1.99 (1.20)
Postgraduate	1.06 (3.39)	4.38 (2.00)*	2.45 (1.94)
Gender	1.27 (.62)*	.15 (.55)	.49 (.68)
Income			
Did not report	−.81 (1.87)	1.05 (1.53)	−.31 (1.55)
Low income	−.55 (1.23)	−.03 (.91)	.47 (1.09)
Lower middle income	−.22 (1.11)	.31 (.91)	1.01 (1.04)
Higher middle income	−2.41 (1.52)	−.52 (1.02)	−1.36 (1.35)
Not in work force	.12 (.86)	.41 (.66)	.14 (.71)
Ancestry			
Mexican	.67 (1.94)	−1.60 (1.19)	.69 (1.50)
Central American	.20 (2.35)	−1.10 (1.28)	1.07 (1.44)
U.S. native	.01 (.97)	−1.08 (.66)	2.25 (.92)*
Religion and social values			
Protestant	2.72 (2.06)	1.53 (1.46)	2.18 (1.57)
Catholic	2.66 (1.43)	.26 (.84)	1.92 (1.07)
Other religion	3.95 (3.37)	.73 (1.89)	2.74 (1.81)
Attend	.23 (.27)	.06 (.20)	−.12 (.19)
Political conservatism	−.74 (.35)*	−.09 (.21)	−.70 (.29)**
Personal, work, and neighborhood context			
Has target group friend	−.07 (1.13)	−2.36 (.95)**	−.77 (2.33)
Coworkers mainly target group	1.09 (1.01)	−2.13 (1.70)	−2.53 (1.59)
Percentage target group in tract	−.01 (.03)	−.01 (.02)	−.03 (.03)
Interview context			
Not same-race interviewer	−1.88 (.88)*	−3.62 (.62)***	−3.08 (.85)***

(Table continues on p. 118.)

TABLE 3.8 *Continued*

	Latino-White Stereotype Difference Score	Latino-Black Stereotype Difference Score	Latino-Asian Stereotype Difference Score
Paused before answering	.87 (.65)	.94 (.50)	.32 (.67)
Justified responses	.82 (1.05)	−.81 (.55)	−.79 (.91)
Showed discomfort	−.59 (1.14)	−.34 (.71)	.96 (1.00)
Objected to section	2.10 (1.23)	−1.18 (.74)	1.62 (1.10)
Racial attitudes			
Common fate	.80 (.33)*	.64 (.28)*	.59 (.34)
SES difference score	.04 (.02)	.06 (.03)*	.04 (.02)
R^2	.09***	.14***	.11**
N	868	878	828

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
Note: Omitted categories for income, education, and religion are high income, high school diploma, and agnostic or atheist, respectively. The omitted category for ancestry is other Latino ancestry.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

were seen as more likely than Asian females to be involved in drugs and gangs and to discriminate against others. But Asian women were seen as more likely to be poor and to be welfare-dependent as compared to Asian men. Among blacks, Asian men as compared to Asian women were seen as more likely to be affluent, to be hard to get along with, to be involved with drugs and gangs, and to have poor English-speaking ability. Among Latino respondents only one significant gender difference emerged, with Asian men seen as more involved in drugs and gangs.

Summary Comments on Stereotyping There are a few broad generalizations that can be made about stereotypes. And certainly everything we report must be conditioned by attention to the seven specific trait dimensions we focused on. Different patterns might emerge if a different set of traits had been examined. First, most adults in Los Angeles County do clearly differentiate the traits of the different racial groups. Second, these differences are never very large in magnitude, though they definitely vary from group to group and trait to trait. Third, there is some tendency for overlap in group self-images and rating by members of other groups. For example, whites are most likely to rate themselves negative on the "discriminate against others" dimension, and this is the dimension on which blacks, Latinos, and Asians also consistently rate

whites negatively. Likewise, blacks rate themselves most negatively on involvement with drugs and gangs, a trait on which whites, Asians, and Latinos also give blacks unfavorable ratings.

Fourth, taking into account the special meaning of speaking "poor English" among a substantially immigrant group as compared to an overwhelmingly native-born group, there is a decided tendency for the most negative ratings to be applied to African Americans. Fifth, the determinants of stereotype perceptions tend be specific to a particular pairing of target group and respondent race. Here, a few interesting patterns emerge. The interview context measures often influence stereotype perceptions, though no one factor is consistently important among this set. Blacks not in the labor force are typically more hostile to each of the other racial groups in terms of stereotypes than those in the labor force. There are some patterns that may be interpreted as evidence of an incipient Chicano consciousness: the consistent effects of common fate identity on stereotypes of other groups, and the strong negative assessment of blacks by highly educated Latinos.

Perceived Group Competition

An immediate sociological concern raised by the growing heterogeneity of urban areas such as Los Angeles County is whether members of different groups view one another as direct competitors for scarce economic, political, and social resources. Such perceptions may influence the potential for coalition formation and cooperation among groups, as well as the prospects for open antagonism and conflict. We focus on two sets of questions from the LASUI that concern interracial competition. These questions attempted to gauge whether members of racial minority groups are viewed as zero-sum competitors for economic resources and political influence. Using a three-way split-ballot experiment, respondents were asked whether they strongly agreed to strongly disagreed with the statements that: "More good job for (blacks/Asians/Hispanics or Latinos) mean fewer good jobs for (respondent's racial-ethnic group)" and "The more political influence (blacks/Asians/Hispanics or Latinos) have in local politics, the less influence (respondent's racial-ethnic group) will have in local politics." Scores on each item range from a low perception of competition (score of 1) to a high perception of competition (score of 5). Consistent with prior research (Bobo and Hutchings 1996), since these items are highly intercorrelated, we also examine a group competition index reflecting a simple average score for the two items. The experimental design makes three types of comparisons possible: within race, we can determine whether a group perceives greater threat from one group as compared to others; within experimen-

tal ballot, we can determine whether one group perceives greater threat from a specific target group; and again within ballot, but also within race, we can determine whether a group feels more threatened economically or politically by another specific group.

Results for comparisons by experimental ballot and within ballot by respondent race are shown in table 3.9 for each individual item and the group competition index. In addition, figure 3.7 shows means scores on the group competition index by race of respondent and race of target group. The first and most general observation to make is that perceptions of competition range from low to moderate among racial minority group members and are quite discernible but low among whites. That is, for whites scores are uniformly above 2 on a 5-point scale, but never reach the midpoint of 3.

Second, only Latinos show responsiveness to the racial target group experimental manipulation. For both the political influence competition and the job opportunity competition items (and therefore the group competition index), Latinos perceive greater threat from Asians than from blacks. This is consistent with the results from a 1992 survey in Los Angeles County as well (Bobo and Hutchings 1996, esp. 958–59). However, neither blacks nor whites are affected by the target group race manipulation, and this is true for both the political influence and job opportunity items.

Third, considering the separate items, whites nonetheless express a slightly higher feeling of political threat than economic threat from minorities (significantly so when either blacks or Latinos are the target group). However, within the respective domains of political competition and economic competition, whites do not distinguish between the level of competition they perceive from blacks, Latinos, or Asians. A parallel pattern occurs among Asian respondents. Pairwise t-tests show that Asian respondents perceive greater political influence threat from blacks and Latinos than economic threat from either group. (This would be consistent with the earlier perceptions of group economic standing.)

Just the opposite patterns occur for blacks. Pairwise t-test results show that blacks feel significantly greater economic threat from both Asians and Latinos than political threat from either group. And Latinos express significantly higher political than economic threat from Asians, but do not differentiate between domains in their reactions to blacks.

We also estimate multivariate models of the determinants of perceptions of threat using the group competition index (see tables 3.10 through 3.13). Three broad patterns are worth noting at the outset. First, there is no single variable that operates to shape perceptions of group competition across respondent race and target group race. Second, in six of the nine equations predicting group competition index scores, the

TABLE 3.9 *Perceptions of Group Competition by Race and Experimental Ballot*

	Asian Economic Threat	Black Economic Threat	Latino Economic Threat	F
White respondents	2.79 (.11)	2.75 (.09)	2.76 (.09)	.03 ns
Black respondents	3.53 (.17)	—	3.38 (.15)	.46 ns
Asian respondents	—	2.69 (.14)	2.80 (.12)	.36 ns
Latino respondents	3.35 (.07)	3.09 (.07)	—	6.57**
F	11.75***	6.68***	94.41***	
	Asian Political Threat	Black Political Threat	Latino Political Threat	F
White respondents	2.85 (.11)	2.89 (.10)	2.93 (.09)	.20 ns
Black respondents	3.36 (.16)	—	3.17 (.14)	.84 ns
Asian respondents	—	2.93 (.12)	3.22 (.12)	2.82 ns
Latino respondents	3.46 (.07)	3.16 (.09)	—	7.12**
F	10.50***	2.83 ns	17.55***	
	Asian Group Threat Index	Black Group Threat Index	Latino Group Threat Index	F
White respondents	2.81 (.10)	2.82 (.08)	2.85 (.08)	.06 ns
Black respondents	3.44 (.16)	—	3.28 (.13)	.69 ns
Asian respondents	—	2.81 (.12)	3.01 (.10)	1.62 ns
Latino respondents	3.40 (.06)	3.13 (.07)	—	8.13**
F	13.26***	5.67***	4.02*	

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

FIGURE 3.7 *Perceived Racial Group Competition Index by Race and Target Group*



Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.

more negative the stereotypes of the target group, the higher the degree of perceived competition. This suggests that perceptions of group competition are at least partly based in more general prejudiced responses to an out-group. Third, with the significant exception of African Americans, we do not find that actual respondent economic status plays much of a role in perceptions of group competition. Otherwise, much of what we do find is specific to each pairing of respondent race and target group race.

In terms of perceived competition with blacks among white respondents, we find that in addition to negative racial stereotypes, the greater the perceived economic disadvantage of blacks the more the sense of threat. Surprisingly, however, the larger the percentage black in a respondent's census tract, the lower the perception of competition. This pattern contradicts the group-size-leads-to-threat hypothesis, but is consistent with the contact hypothesis and other recent findings (Ellison and Powers 1994; Kinder and Mendelberg 1995).

Among black respondents there are strong effects of income on perceptions of competition, with lower-income individuals scoring higher. Common fate identity also increased feelings of competition with

(Text continues on p. 127.)

TABLE 3.10 *Multivariate Models of Competitive Group Threat, White Respondents*

	Black Competitive Threat	Asian Competitive Threat	Latino Competitive Threat
Constant	2.31 (.61)***	.39 (.52)	2.63 (.55)***
Social background			
Age	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)*	.00 (.00)
Education			
No high school diploma	1.11 (.31)***	−.14 (.47)	−.45 (.47)
Some college	−.01 (.18)	−.07 (.18)	−.01 (.21)
Bachelor's degree	−.07 (.19)	−.31 (.24)	−.27 (.20)
Postgraduate	−.24 (.24)	.05 (.30)	−.28 (.24)
Gender	.02 (.15)	−.24 (.16)	−.02 (.14)
Income			
Did not report	.28 (.26)	−.14 (.27)	.52 (.25)*
Low income	.09 (.22)	.19 (.24)	−.14 (.25)
Lower middle income	.16 (.25)	−.21 (.20)	−.09 (.18)
Higher middle income	.07 (.18)	−.07 (.27)	.11 (.19)
Not in work force	−.03 (.14)	.14 (.17)	.06 (.15)
Religion and social values			
Protestant	.04 (.25)	.32 (.25)	−.08 (.19)
Catholic	.24 (.24)	.32 (.25)	−.37 (.26)
Jewish	.35 (.25)	−.17 (.36)	−.15 (.28)
Other religion	.28 (.29)	.05 (.30)	.18 (.27)
Attend	−.01 (.04)	.21 (.05)***	−.07 (.04)
Political conservatism	.06 (.06)	.21 (.07)**	.08 (.05)
Personal, work, and neighborhood context			
Has target group friend	.23 (.21)	−.16 (.43)	.09 (.14)
Coworkers mainly target group	−.27 (.28)	.12 (.43)	−.55 (.20)**
Percentage target group in tract	−.02 (.01)*	−.00 (.01)	−.01 (.01)
Interview context			
Not same-race interviewer	−.08 (.15)	−.27 (.16)	.16 (.19)
Paused before answering	−.09 (.14)	.17 (.17)	.04 (.18)
Justified responses	.10 (.19)	.11 (.22)	.21 (.16)
Showed discomfort	−.24 (.20)	.14 (.25)	−.01 (.20)
Objected to section	−.04 (.64)	.28 (.38)	−.19 (.26)
Racial attitudes			
Common fate	−.13 (.07)	.09 (.07)	.17 (.05)***
Stereotype difference score	.05 (.01)***	.03 (.01)	.01 (.01)
SES difference score	−.02 (.01)**	.00 (.01)	.01 (.01)
R^2	.36***	.33***	.27***
N	255	233	253

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
Note: Omitted categories for income, education, and religion are high income, high school diploma, and agnostic or atheist, respectively.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

TABLE 3.11 *Multivariate Models of Competitive Group Threat, Black Respondents*

	Asian Competitive Threat	Latino Competitive Threat
Constant	2.36 (.51)*	2.80 (.67)***
Social background		
Age	.01 (.00)**	.01 (.00)
Education		
No high school diploma	−.55 (.22)**	−.33 (.23)
Some college	−.37 (.17)*	−.31 (.21)
Bachelor's degree	−.50 (.32)	−.44 (.27)
Postgraduate	.37 (.33)	−1.29 (.46)**
Gender	−.35 (.13)**	−.17 (.18)
Income		
Did not report	.66 (.35)	.24 (.32)
Low income	.75 (.26)**	.10 (.25)
Lower middle inome	.39 (.27)	.12 (.29)
Higher middle income	.09 (.37)	.10 (.29)
Not in work force	−.22 (.14)	.22 (.18)
Religion and social values		
Protestant	.11 (.21)	.23 (.23)
Catholic	−.06 (.36)	.38 (.29)
Other religion	−.01 (.28)	−.32 (.32)
Attend	.06 (.04)	−.06 (.05)
Political conservatism	.06 (.05)	.08 (.06)
Personal, work, and neighborhood context		
Has target group friend	−.81 (.35)*	−.48 (.40)
Coworkers mainly target group	−.03 (.38)	−.18 (.24)
Percentage target group in tract	−.00 (.01)	.01 (.01)
Interview context		
Not same-race interviewer	−.77 (.21)***	−.36 (.19)
Paused before answering	−.06 (.12)	.06 (.19)
Justified responses	−.03 (.14)	−.12 (.18)
Showed discomfort	.31 (.24)	−.77 (.23)***
Objected to section	−.09 (.37)	.18 (.36)
Racial attitudes		
Common fate	.20 (.06)***	.08 (.07)
Stereotype difference score	.03 (.01)***	.02 (.01)**
SES difference score	−.01 (.00)	.01 (.01)
R^2	.42***	.36***
N	503	500

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
Note: Omitted categories for income, education, and religion are high income, high school diploma, and agnostic or atheist, respectively.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

TABLE 3.12 *Multivariate Models of Competitive Group Threat, Asian Respondents*

	Black Competitive Threat	Latino Competitive Threat
Constant	1.82 (.66)	1.07 (.47)*
Social background		
Age	.02 (.00)***	.01 (.00)
Education		
No high school diploma	−.26 (.20)	.33 (.22)
Some college	−.05 (.14)	.01 (.16)
Bachelor's degree	−.04 (.12)	.09 (.17)
Postgraduate	.30 (.18)	.07 (.21)
Gender	.13 (.11)	−.10 (.14)
Income		
Did not report	−.13 (.15)	.09 (.15)
Low income	−.29 (.17)	−.14 (.17)
Lower middle income	−.19 (.19)	.04 (.15)
Higher middle income	−.21 (.19)	−.06 (.13)
Not in work force	.01 (.12)	−.17 (.11)
Ancestry		
Chinese	.79 (.55)	.62 (.37)
Japanese	.61 (.55)	.52 (.38)
Korean	1.06 (.56)	1.15 (.38)**
U.S. native	−.39 (.17)*	−.20 (.17)
Religion and social values		
Protestant	−.12 (.23)	−.01 (.16)
Catholic	−.11 (.21)	−.12 (.20)
Other religion	−.19 (.15)	−.07 (.13)
Attend	−.04 (.05)	.07 (.03)*
Political conservatism	−.04 (.04)	.10 (.05)*
Personal, work, and neighborhood context		
Has target group friend	.10 (.19)	.20 (.26)
Coworkers mainly target group	.19 (.41)	−.25 (.19)
Percent target group in tract	−.00 (.01)	.00 (.00)
Interview context		
Not same-race interviewer	−.12 (.17)	−.07 (.17)
Paused before answering	.05 (.12)	.10 (.10)
Justified responses	−.07 (.14)	−.09 (.13)
Showed discomfort	−.22 (.19)	−.29 (.26)
Objected to section	−.04 (.22)	−.22 (.18)
Racial attitudes		
Common fate	−.03 (.05)	.08 (.06)
Stereotype difference score	.03 (.01)**	.03 (.01)***
SES difference score	−.01 (.01)	−.00 (.00)
R^2	.39***	.40***
N	358	340

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
Note: Omitted categories for income, education, and religion are high income, high school diploma, and agnostic or atheist, respectively. The omitted category for ancestry is other Asian ancestry.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

TABLE 3.13 *Multivariate Models of Competitive Group Threat, Latino Respondents*

	Black Competitive Threat	Asian Competitive Threat
Constant	2.76 (.65)	3.93 (.54)
Social background		
Age	.01 (.01)	−.00 (.00)
Education		
No high school diploma	.17 (.18)	−.20 (.15)
Some college	.03 (.19)	−.50 (.25)*
Bachelor's degree	.10 (.31)	−.75 (.24)**
Postgraduate	−.41 (.40)	−.92 (.43)*
Gender	.05 (.12)	.02 (.14)
Income		
Did not report	.55 (.45)	.13 (.39)
Low income	.34 (.41)	−.13 (.32)
Lower middle income	.18 (.40)	.03 (.29)
Higher middle income	−.12 (.39)	−.16 (.32)
Not in work force	.05 (.14)	.30 (.14)*
Ancestry		
Mexican	−.23 (.22)	−.15 (.23)
Central American	−.40 (.23)	.06 (.26)
U.S. native	−.17 (.20)	.09 (.17)
Religion and social values		
Protestant	−.46 (.34)	−.48 (.34)
Catholic	.16 (.22)	.09 (.28)
Other religion	−.18 (.36)	−.42 (.55)
Attend	−.04 (.05)	−.03 (.03)
Political conservatism	−.01 (.04)	.03 (.04)
Personal, work, and neighborhood context		
Has target group friend	.18 (.30)	−.32 (.44)
Coworkers mainly target group	.12 (.33)	−.33 (.22)
Percent target group in tract	.00 (.00)	−.01 (.01)**
Interview context		
Not same-race inerviewer	−.11 (.18)	−.31 (.15)*
Paused before answering	−.06 (.14)	−.00 (.13)
Justified responses	−.31 (.21)	.04 (.16)
Showed discomfort	−.34 (.21)	−.17 (.18)
Objected to section	−.06 (.18)	−.20 (.17)
Racial attitudes		
Common fate	.22 (.06)***	−.00 (.05)
Stereotype difference score	−.00 (.01)	.01 (.01)
SES difference score	−.00 (.01)	−.01 (.00)
R^2	.20***	.21***
N	413	425

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
Note: Omitted categories for income, education, and religion are high income, high school diploma, and agnostic or atheist, respectively. The omitted category for ancestry is other Latino ancestry.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

Asians among blacks and, somewhat unexpectedly, the better-educated express a greater sense of competition with Asians as well. The pattern is different for blacks' responses to Latinos. In this case, feelings of competition are negatively related to education and show mild sensitivity to aspects of the interview context.

Among the Asian respondents there is a strong relationship between stereotypes and perceptions of group competition. This holds for perceptions of competition with both blacks and Latinos. In addition, national ancestry matters, with Koreans expressing significantly greater feelings of competition with Latinos than do Asians of other national origins, and there is an effect of borderline significance ($p = .082$) in the same direction with regard to competition with blacks.

Among Latinos, perceptions of threat from blacks are related only to common fate identity. The higher the level of expressed common fate identity, the greater the perceived competition with blacks. Latinos' perceptions of competition with Asians decline as education rises, as the percentage Asian in the respondent's census tract rises, and when the respondent has Asian coworkers.

Opposition to Affirmative Action

One of the primary reasons for an interest in studies of attitudes on race relations is that policy preferences that are widely shared and intensely felt in this domain are likely to find some expression in concrete social policy. Such preferences appear to provide some of the most compelling evidence of a meaningful connection between verbally expressed attitudes and overt social behavior (Schuman 1995). For example, survey data had for some time pointed in the direction of the passage of both Proposition 187, curtailing the social services that could be extended to undocumented immigrants, and subsequently Proposition 209, banning affirmative action in state contracts, hiring, and higher education.

The LASUI contained a set of questions on support for affirmative action. One set asked whether respondents favored or opposed "special training and educational assistance" programs for members of groups who have faced disadvantages in the past. The question referred separately to programs for blacks, for Latinos, and for Asians. The second set of questions, in reference to the same set of racial groups, asked about attitudes on affirmative action involving "preferences in hiring and promotion." These questions thus allow us to gauge how the content of the policy—mild versus fairly strong forms of affirmative action—influences responses.[5] Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show mean levels of opposition to affirmative action by race for "job training and educational assistance" and "preferences in hiring and promotion," respectively. As we will

FIGURE 3.8 *Mean Opposition to Race-Based "Special Job Training and Educational Assistance" Programs by Race*



Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.

elaborate, the content of the policy, the racial target group, and respondent race all influence opinions on affirmative action.

Three patterns stand out immediately. First, the special job training and educational assistance version of affirmative action is consistently more popular than the preferences in hiring and promotion version. This result is consistent with the findings from many other studies (see Schuman et al. 1997; Steeh and Krysan 1996). Our results differ principally in moving beyond the usual black-white comparison in both question wording and samples. It is also worth noting that opinions do not indicate monolithic opposition to even the stronger version of affirmative action. Second, there are consistently significant racial group differences in opinion. Racial minorities, especially African Americans and Latinos, are less likely to oppose affirmative action than are whites and, to a lesser degree, Asians. Again, however, these differences cannot be read as enormous or gaping divides, even though they are quite real. Third, blacks and Latinos each express slightly lower levels of opposition to affirmative action when targeted on their own group as compared to the other.

The pattern of differential policy goal, racial target group, and re-

FIGURE 3.9 *Mean Opposition to Race-Based "Preferences in Hiring and Promotion" by Race*



Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.

spondent race effects on the level of opposition to affirmative action carries over into the results of our multivariate analysis of individual variation in affirmative action opinions. The single most consistently influential variable is the perception of economic status differences between groups. This variable has significant effects for eight of the eighteen equations estimated in tables 3.14 through 3.17. Generally, the larger the perceived economic disadvantage of a racial minority group, the less the opposition to affirmative action. In effect, the greater the perceived neediness of a group, the less likely an individual is to object to affirmative action targeted at members of that group (Kluegel 1985). Beliefs about the degree of economic inequality between groups, as argued by the sociologist James Kluegel (Kluegel and Smith 1986; Kluegel 1990), play an important role in the policy debate about affirmative action. We find that negative stereotypes increased opposition to affirmative action in only four of the eighteen equations (most reliably so in the case of whites' opposition to preferences in hiring and promotion for blacks).

In addition, respondent age (seven of eighteen equations) and self-described political ideology (six of eighteen equations) also tended to

TABLE 3.14 *Multivariate Models of Opposition to Affirmative Action, White Respondents*

	Education and Training for Blacks	Education and Training for Asians	Education and Training for Latinos	Hiring and Promotion for Blacks	Hiring and Promotion for Asians	Hiring and Promotion for Latinos
Constant	3.78 (.77)***	2.12 (.54)***	2.06 (.66)**	4.81 (.58)***	3.21 (.45)	2.62 (.56)***
Social background						
Age	−.01 (.01)*	−.00 (.00)	−.01 (.01)	−.01 (.01)*	.00 (.01)	−.01 (.00)
Education						
No high school diploma	−1.11 (.30)***	−.48 (.30)	−.60 (.37)	−.16 (.40)	−.14 (.36)	.12 (.49)
Some college	−.38 (.17)*	.03 (.23)	.12 (.15)	.22 (.22)	−.12 (.20)	−.08 (.22)
Bachelor's degree	−.22 (.20)	.02 (.24)	−.26 (.21)	.02 (.19)	−.24 (.24)	−.08 (.21)
Postgraduate	−.49 (.26)	.05 (.29)	−.38 (.31)	.02 (.26)	−.67 (.28)*	−.22 (.28)
Gender	.36 (.15)*	.16 (.15)	.14 (.20)	.17 (.15)	.05 (.14)	.12 (.18)
Income						
Did not report	−.46 (.33)	−.40 (.25)	.14 (.44)	−.44 (.35)	−.94 (.34)**	.10 (.21)
Low income	−.66 (.23)**	−.25 (.23)	−.26 (.28)	−.52 (.26)*	−.74 (.31)*	−.65 (.32)*
Lower middle income	−.36 (.20)*	−.24 (.22)	−.19 (.24)	−.18 (.17)	−.62 (.20)**	−.37 (.18)*
Higher middle income	−.23 (.24)	.03 (.23)	−.28 (.21)	.08 (.19)	−.42 (.18)*	−.10 (.15)
Not in work force	.12 (.19)	.13 (.17)	−.06 (.21)	−.02 (.21)	−.06 (.19)	−.30 (.20)
Religion and social values						
Protestant	−.50 (.32)	.33 (.19)	−.38 (.32)	.10 (.24)	.07 (.23)	−.13 (.31)
Catholic	−.50 (.33)	.57 (.20)**	−.36 (.35)	.03 (.22)	.14 (.24)	−.31 (.34)
Jewish	−.64 (.32)*	.06 (.30)	−.54 (.39)	−.66 (.28)*	−.02 (.34)	−.07 (.36)
Other religion	−.48 (.41)	.01 (.31)	−.90 (.38)*	.25 (.26)	−.50 (.26)	−.29 (.36)
Attend	−.02 (.05)	.06 (.05)	.02 (.06)	−.09 (.04)*	−.00 (.05)	.10 (.04)*
Political conservatism	.04 (.08)	.10 (.05)*	.15 (.07)*	.08 (.06)	.12 (.05)	.25 (.05)***
Personal, work, and neighborhood context						
Has target group friend	−.14 (.20)	−.45 (.29)	.03 (.20)	.24 (.27)	.46 (.27)	−.10 (.17)
Coworkers mainly target group	.07 (.49)	.51 (.26)*	−.32 (.35)	−.14 (.41)	.48 (.34)	−.69 (.32)*
Percentage target group in tract	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.00 (.01)	−.02 (.01)*	−.02 (.07)	.02 (.01)**
Interview context						
Not same-race interviewer	.09 (.15)	−.33 (.16)*	−.25 (.14)	−.02 (.14)	−.36 (.14)**	−.07 (.17)
Paused before answering	.09 (.19)	−.07 (.18)	.12 (.21)	−.03 (.17)	−.04 (.19)	.10 (.17)
Justified responses	.00 (.28)	−.14 (.22)	−.00 (.24)	.03 (.21)	−.23 (.28)	−.14 (.23)
Showed discomfort	−.36 (.23)	.35 (.24)	−.12 (.20)	−.16 (.18)	.03 (.20)	−.17 (.22)
Objected to section	.75 (.27)**	1.12 (.22)***	.49 (.54)	.21 (.48)	.47 (.45)	−.32 (.29)
Racial attitudes						
Common fate	−.10 (.08)	−.05 (.07)	−.02 (.08)	−.06 (.09)	.15 (.07)*	−.05 (.06)
Stereotype difference score	.00 (.01)	.02 (.01)*	.03 (.02)	.04 (.01)***	.02 (.01)	.02 (.01)
SES difference score	−.02 (.01)**	−.02 (.01)**	−.00 (.01)	−.03 (.01)***	−.01 (.01)	−.02 (.01)**
Threat from target group	.13 (.10)	−.06 (.07)	.18 (.07)**	−.22 (.10)*	−.02 (.07)	.04 (.07)
R^2	.26***	.25***	.23***	.31***	.33***	.28***
N	248	225	253	247	225	253

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
Note: Omitted categories for education, income, and religion are high school diploma, high income, and agnostic or atheist, respectively.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

TABLE 3.15 *Multivariate Models of Opposition to Affirmative Action, Black Respondents*

	Education and Training for Asians	Education and Training for Latinos	Hiring and Promotion for Asians	Hiring and Promotion for Latinos
Constant	2.54 (.51)***	1.84 (.56)***	3.58 (.49)***	2.33 (.64)***
Social background				
Age	−.01 (.00)	.01 (.00)	−.01 (.00)*	.00 (.00)
Education				
No high school diploma	−.26 (.23)	−.05 (.22)	−.32 (.23)	−.09 (.24)
Some college	−.25 (.16)	−.23 (.17)	−.18 (.17)	−.10 (.15)
Bachelor's degree	−.54 (.26)*	−.30 (.23)	−.02 (.25)	−.06 (.28)
Postgraduate	−.74 (.30)*	−.12 (.32)	−.26 (.24)	−.29 (.28)
Gender	.01 (.14)	.04 (.16)	.10 (.14)	−.11 (.16)
Income				
Did not report	−.24 (.31)	.33 (.19)	.08 (.31)	.26 (.25)
Low income	−.18 (.23)	.14 (.20)	−.04 (.23)	−.03 (.23)
Lower middle income	−.11 (.25)	.63 (.23)**	−.14 (.22)	.34 (.22)
Higher middle income	−.39 (.26)	.51 (.23)*	−.60 (.27)*	.10 (.21)
Not in work force	−.24 (.14)	−.30 (.16)	−.15 (.17)	−.35 (.13)**
Religion and social values				
Protestant	.09 (.18)	−.39 (.33)	.12 (.20)	−.07 (.23)
Catholic	.70 (.38)	−.38 (.32)	.36 (.33)	−.12 (.29)
Other religion	.34 (.32)	−.71 (.40)	.54 (.31)	−.16 (.32)
Attend	.09 (.04)	.01 (.03)	−.01 (.04)	−.01 (.04)
Political conservatism	−.04 (.04)	−.03 (.04)	−.05 (.05)	−.02 (.04)
Personal, work, and neighborhood context				
Has target group friend	−.55 (.34)	.09 (.32)	−.02 (.21)	.56 (.27)*
Coworkers mainly target group	.13 (.36)	−.17 (.18)	.76 (.27)**	.01 (.21)
Percentage target group in tract	−.00 (.01)	−.00 (.01)	−.01 (.00)	.00 (.01)
Interview context				
Not same-race interviewer	−.34 (.23)	.16 (.18)	−.10 (.25)	.22 (.16)

TABLE 3.15 *Continued*

	Education and Training for Asians	Education and Training for Latinos	Hiring and Promotion for Asians	Hiring and Promotion for Latinos
Paused before answering	−.04 (.15)	−.12 (.13)	.03 (.15)	.02 (.13)
Justified responses	−.11 (.15)	.05 (.19)	−.14 (.14)	−.01 (.16)
Showed discomfort	−.61 (.24)**	−.00 (.26)	−.44 (.27)	−.28 (.23)
Objected to section	−.35 (.32)	−.09 (.38)	−.06 (.29)	−.14 (.38)
Racial attitudes				
Common fate	−.08 (.07)	−.08 (.07)	.00 (.07)	−.11 (.07)
Stereotype difference score	.02 (.01)*	−.00 (.01)	.02 (.01)	.01 (.01)
SES difference score	−.01 (.00)**	−.01 (.01)	−.01 (.00)**	−.01 (.01)
Threat from target group	.09 (.07)	.15 (.05)***	−.07 (.07)	.12 (.06)
R^2	.25***	.16*	.17***	.13***
N	503	500	502	499

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
Note: Omitted categories for education, income, and religion are high school diploma, high income, and agnostic or atheist, respectively.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

influence views on affirmative action. Younger people and political liberals expressed less opposition to affirmative action than did their older and more conservative counterparts. Lastly, for ten of the eighteen affirmative action equations, we find some impact of income on opinions. However, this effect is not consistent in direction. Among white respondents, those in the highest income category tended to express the greatest opposition to affirmative action (four out of six equations). Among blacks, it is the middle-income categories who are more likely to oppose education and training affirmative action for Latinos. And among Asians, those in the middle-income categories are also more likely than those in the highest-income category to oppose preference in hiring and promotion for Latinos.

Perhaps more striking than these few consistent patterns of individual variation is the general absence of effects for many of the personal, work, and neighborhood context measures, for the interview context measures, and for the other racial attitude measures. With respect to this last, in only three instances do perceptions of threat have the ex-

TABLE 3.16 *Multivariate Models of Opposition to Affirmative Action, Asian Respondents*

	Education and Training for Blacks	Education and Training for Latinos	Hiring and Promotion for Blacks	Hiring and Promotion for Latinos
Constant	3.01 (.60)	2.90 (.43)***	3.31 (.73)	3.31 (.46)***
Social background				
Age	−.01 (.00)*	−.01 (.01)	−.02 (.01)**	.01.(.00)***
Education				
No high school diploma	−.26 (.23)	.72 (.26)**	.25 (.26)	.49 (.18)**
Some college	−.17 (.16)	.16 (.19)	−.26 (.18)	.14 (.15)
Bachelor's degree	−.36 (.15)*	−.13 (.15)	−.44 (.15)**	.06 (.12)
Postgraduate	−.36 (.19)	−.07 (.22)	−.66 (.28)*	−.08 (.17)
Gender	.27 (.13)*	.29 (.12)*	.11 (.15)	.12 (.10)
Income				
Did not report	−.20 (.21)	.04 (.19)	−.54 (.19)**	.27 (.17)
Low income	−.24 (.21)	−.14 (.22)	−.55 (.23)*	−.12 (.20)
Lower middle income	−.57 (.21)**	.07 (.16)	−.91 (.24)***	.15 (.16)
Higher middle income	−.22 (.21)	.17 (.18)	−.30 (.22)	.56 (.15)***
Not in work force	.09 (.13)	.05 (.11)	−.27 (.15)	.05 (.10)
Ancestry				
Chinese	.37 (.40)	.54 (.36)	.85 (.49)	.14 (.35)
Japanese	.60 (.39)	.53 (.37)	1.43 (.47)**	.77 (.39)*
Korean	−.29 (.42)	.56 (.36)	.85 (.48)	.64 (.38)
U.S. native	−.76 (.21)***	.08 (.18)	−.48 (.21)*	−.02 (.16)
Religion and social values				
Protestant	−.02 (.20)	−.66 (.18)***	−.11 (.23)	−.09 (.18)
Catholic	.14 (.24)	−.21 (.21)	−.38 (.25)	−.28 (.19)
Other religion	−.17 (.19)	−.18 (.18)	−.27 (.20)	.06 (.15)
Attend	−.03 (.05)	−.06 (.04)	−.08 (.05)	−.03 (.03)
Political conservatism	.05 (.04)	.12 (.05)**	.18 (.05)***	.09 (.04)*
Personal, work, and neighborhood context				
Has target group friend	.32 (.21)	−.44 (.30)	.00 (.26)	−.41 (.29)
Coworkers mainly target group	−.22 (.21)	−.05 (.23)	.40 (.29)	−.23 (.17)
Percentage target group in tract	.00 (.01)	−.01 (.00)	.01 (.02)	−.01 (.00)*

TABLE 3.16 *Continued*

	Education and Training for Blacks	Education and Training for Latinos	Hiring and Promotion for Blacks	Hiring and Promotion for Latinos
Interview context				
Not same-race interviewer	.39 (.27)	−.08 (.23)	−.03 (.28)	.03 (.23)
Paused before answering	−.09 (.14)	.13 (.16)	−.17 (.20)	.52 (.13)***
Justified responses	−.02 (.17)	−.04 (.20)	.24 (.22)	−.43 (.18)*
Showed discomfort	−.63 (.25)**	−.24 (.32)	−.67 (.34)*	−.28 (.28)
Objected to section	.84 (.31)**	.11 (.25)	.62 (.30)*	.22 (.25)
Racial attitudes				
Common fate	−.02 (.07)	.24 (.06)***	.05 (.06)	−.16 (.05)**
Stereotype difference score	−.00 (.01)	.03 (.01)*	−.01 (.01)	.00 (.01)
SES difference score	−.02 (.00)***	−.02 (.01)**	−.00 (.01)	−.00 (.00)
Threat from target group	.00 (.06)	−.03 (.08)	−.02 (.07)	−.03 (.07)
R^2	.39***	.35***	.36***	.40***
N	355	340	355	340

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
Note: Omitted categories for education, income, religion, and ancestry are high school diploma, high income, agnostic or atheist, and other Asian ancestry, respectively.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

pected effect. Whites and blacks who perceive more threat from Latinos are more likely to oppose education and training programs for Latinos. In addition, there is a borderline effect of threat on blacks' opposition to preference in hiring and promotion for Latinos ($p = .06$).

These results prompt us to reiterate a point we made at the outset: often what is analytically most important about intergroup attitudes is the extent and nature of group differences in viewpoints, not the sources of individual variation within a group (see Jackman 1994). If, rather than examining within racial group determinants of affirmative action opinion, we pooled the data across race and estimated six equations (three racial minority target groups by two types of policies) and introduced race as a variable (a set of dummy coded variables with whites as the omitted category), the results speak plainly. There are highly significant racial group differences for all six equations net of all social background

TABLE 3.17 *Multivariate Models of Opposition to Affirmative Action, Latino Respondents*

	Education and Training for Blacks	Education and Training for Asians	Hiring and Promotion for Blacks	Hiring and Promotion for Asians
Constant	1.41 (.56)**	2.48 (.57)***	3.13 (.58)***	3.54 (.52)***
Social background				
Age	−.00 (.00)	−.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	−.01 (.00)*
Education				
No high school diploma	.19 (.13)	−.03 (.13)	−.01 (.14)	−.39 (.14)**
Some college	.22 (.15)	.03 (.18)	.07 (.18)	−.08 (.17)
Bachelor's degree	.44 (.30)	.31 (.21)	−.10 (.32)	−.15 (.24)
Postgraduate	−.94 (.25)***	−.43 (.55)	.48 (.72)	.87 (.50)
Gender	.26 (.12)*	−.09 (.13)	−.10 (.10)	.19 (.10)
Income				
Did not report	.12 (.32)	−.75 (.28)**	−.11 (.30)	−.18 (.33)
Low income	−.13 (.24)	−.20 (.26)	−.18 (.22)	.10 (.22)
Lower middle income	−.36 (.23)	−.21 (.23)	−.11 (.23)	.02 (.23)
Higher middle income	−.19 (.27)	−.46 (.27)	−.26 (.23)	−.19 (.24)
Not in work force	−.07 (.10)	.19 (.14)	−.08 (.11)	.06 (.12)
Ancestry				
Mexican	.43 (.18)*	−.14 (.24)	−.34 (.27)	−.12 (.25)
Central American	.29 (.22)	−.14 (.28)	−.20 (.29)	−.23 (.26)
U.S. native	.04 (.16)	.06 (.16)	.02 (.15)	.11 (.20)
Religion and social values				
Protestant	.03 (.26)	.21 (.33)	−.25 (.28)	−.25 (.36)
Catholic	−.03 (.19)	−.05 (.26)	−.19 (.17)	−.14 (.23)
Other religion	−.40 (.33)	.33 (.36)	−.70 (.39)	−.29 (.30)
Attend	−.01 (.04)	.07 (.04)	−.04 (.04)	.00 (.04)
Political conservatism	.07 (.04)	−.03 (.04)	.07 (.04)	.02 (.05)
Personal, work, and neighborhood context				
Has target group friend	−.33 (.29)	.13 (.22)	−.09 (.44)	.60 (.38)
Coworkers mainly target group	−.08 (.27)	.04 (.28)	−.46 (.33)	.62 (.21)**
Percentage target group in tract	−.00 (.00)	−.01 (.00)	−.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)

TABLE 3.17 *Continued*

	Education and Training for Blacks	Education and Training for Asians	Hiring and Promotion for Blacks	Hiring and Promotion for Asians
Interview context				
Not same-race interviewer	.13 (.15)	.11 (.16)	−.02 (.15)	.02 (.15)
Paused before answering	.14 (.09)	.09 (.11)	.00 (.11)	−.14 (.09)
Justified responses	−.14 (.13)	.13 (.14)	−.02 (.15)	−.06 (.15)
Showed discomfort	.01 (.16)	−.24 (.18)	.05 (.20)	.16 (.16)
Objected to section	.45 (.19)*	−.25 (.16)	.37 (.19)*	.16 (.13)
Racial attitudes				
Common fate	−.07 (.05)	−.15 (.05)**	−.06 (.05)	−.01 (.04)
Stereotype difference score	.00 (.01)	.01 (.01)	−.00 (.01)	−.01 (.01)
SES difference score	−.00 (.00)	−.01 (.00)***	−.00 (.00)	−.00 (.00)
Threat from target group	.02 (.06)	.04 (.07)	.01 (.05)	−.08 (.05)
R^2	.21***	.18***	.13*	.21***
N	413	425	413	425

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
Note: Omitted categories for education, income, religion, and ancestry are high school diploma, high income, agnostic or atheist, and other Latino ancestry, respectively.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

measures, religion and social values measures, and interview context measures. Whites are uniformly the most likely to oppose affirmative action and blacks the least likely to do so. Asians do not differ significantly from whites in level of opposition to special education and training programs, irrespective of race of the target group, but express significantly less opposition to preferences in hiring and promotion.

Our results suggest that the debate over how the state should intervene to influence racial group positions in the labor market is most profoundly structured by the specific policy formulations or goal, by racial group membership and the interests attendant thereto, and the configuration of relations among particular groups (Bobo and Kluegel 1993). Each of these types of factors has a collective, institutional, and group-level center of concern. Still, policy goal and group membership do not exhaust the sources of opinion on affirmative action. At the individual

level, we do find that the perceived neediness of a group, the ideological leanings of an individual, and, to a less consistent degree, stereotype beliefs, level of income, and perceptions of threat also play into opinions on affirmative action.

Conclusion

In imposing or drawing out some coherent threads or implications, it is useful to return to the opening juxtaposition of scenarios. Recall that we contrasted, at one extreme, a situation of contentious racial polarization to, at the other extreme, a situation of racial harmony and fluidity. In terms of the several types of attitudes we measured, it is fair to say that Los Angeles is not particularly close to either extreme, though the tilt, ever so mildly, would be in the direction of the latter state of affairs. In terms of major conclusions, we find that:

(1) The great majority of adults in Los Angeles do see their fate as individuals as bound up to some degree with that of others of similar race;

(2) Just about everyone sees and agrees on the presence of race-linked differences in economic standing;

(3) Just about everyone sees some noteworthy differences in behavioral predispositions among and between racial groups, though these differences are rarely seen as categorical or extreme and sometimes exhibit a degree of in-group and out-group consensus;

(4) Perceptions of racial group competition are common, though never acute; and

(5) There is a real and durable, if unremarkable, connection between racial group membership and how one is likely to feel about affirmative action.

The broadest implication of these results, as Cornel West (1993) put it so aptly, is that race matters! In an era when some scholars have announced the end of racism (D'Souza 1995) and others have suggested that we abandon talking about and measuring racial group differences (Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1997), this is an important point to reinforce and reinforce loudly. There are noteworthy racial group differences and group-specific patterning of results in each of the domains we examined. If, as Mary Jackman (1994) has persuasively argued, intergroup attitudes are centrally the property of groups and yield information about the dynamics of group relations, then these results point to a strong degree of racialization of the contemporary urban environment (Sanjek 1994).

Yet, we are prompted to temper this conclusion immediately with another observation. The heuristic model (recall figure 3.1) we structured our individual-level analysis around did not fare very well on the whole. That is, our results cannot be read as identifying a firmly and consistently socially rooted set of attitudes and beliefs that, among themselves, are also tightly interlaced. Instead, a second broad implication of our results is that there are often specific issues and sets of social relations and an emergent, often situational, and dynamic character to race relations (see Oliver and Johnson 1984). As Wilson has argued: "It is important to recognize that racial antagonisms, or the manifestation of racial tensions, are products of economic, political, and social situations" (1996, xx).

Even though race relations will play out in highly contingent and situationally specific ways, a third implication of our research is the expectation that the types of identities, attitudes, and beliefs we mapped here should hold transsituational relevance. We have charted important features of the cognitive, emotional, and identity-based considerations that individuals and groups will likely bring with them into a wide array of social situations. Thus, for example, as a person enters the housing market, it is reasonable to assume that he or she attends to social cues concerning the racial background of potential neighbors, holds distinct views of the characteristics of members of different racial groups, and expects different patterns of relation and interaction as a result. Likewise, in the workplace we should expect the same types of social lenses to be applied. None of these considerations ordains specific outcomes. But our results clearly show that racial considerations cannot be ignored across the domains of social life.

More than this, a fourth and final broad implication of our results is that elements of the classic American racial order or hierarchy, with whites still ensconced at the top, blacks still at the bottom, and the Asian and Latino populations arrayed in between, continues to exist (Gans 1999). White respondents perceive a sense of comfortable, but not categorical, superiority to racial minority group members and do not see themselves as being under acute competitive pressures. They are the most likely to consistently oppose affirmative action. The only stereotype personality trait for which minority group members consistently perceive whites in a poor light concerns a pattern of discriminating against others. African Americans, on the whole, are given the most negative stereotype ratings by others, are among those most likely to view race relations in competitive terms, most consistently express support for affirmative action, and are the most acutely race-conscious. The results for Latinos in some respects parallel those for African Americans but differ in noteworthy ways. Among these exceptions are greater con-

cessions are made by Latinos to negative stereotypes held by the dominant group and a real strain of resistance to thinking of themselves in terms of racial group identity. Both Asians and Latinos exhibit tendencies for national ancestry–based attachments (rather than panethnic or racial attachments), and their experiences are variously conditioned by recency of immigration and class background.

There are those who may think the degree of racialized thinking is acutely high in Los Angeles, or that the dynamics are somehow importantly different from those in most other major metropolitan areas. Although possible, this is highly unlikely to be the case. In each of the major domains we examined, data on comparable measures in national samples are reassuringly similar. It is also unlikely that a number of local and potentially jarring race-related social events played a distorting role in our analysis. Thus, the initial airing of the infamous Rodney King beating video occurred more than two years prior to the start of LASUI data collection; the acquittal of the LAPD officers who beat King by a Simi Valley jury and the subsequent uprising in Los Angeles precede our survey by more than twelve months; and the highly divisive acquittal of O.J. Simpson in the criminal trial for the murders of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman occurred a year and a half after the completion of the LASUI field period. What is more, careful analyses conducted at the time of the rioting in Los Angeles make it clear that the impact of dramatic events on racial attitudes and beliefs is generally small to nonexistent (Bobo et al. 1994).

Our results are made all the more important, indeed, by virtue of focusing on a single, highly diverse metropolitan area. Unlike most studies of racial outlooks that draw on national data, it is safe to assume that our respondents constitute a more cohesive social community than is ordinarily examined in studies of racial attitudes. As residents of the same metropolis, they share a common environmental mix of racial and ethnic groups, a common set of broad economic conditions, a common media environment, and a common dependence on many of the same local and statewide institutions of government. Many of the vast array of factors ordinarily left uncontrolled (and often uncontrollable) in analyses of national data do not arise for our work. We are thus able to provide a sharp focus on processes of racial identity, attitude, and belief in a way that is not instantly rendered opaque by large differences in region, community size, institutions of local or state government, or other unique historical events and conditions. Furthermore, as we stress throughout this volume, Los Angeles is a crucial case for examining these processes, since it is at the leading edge of social trends now affecting most major metropolitan areas.

Crucially, with regard to the issues that will dominate our attention

in this volume, we believe these results provide strong warrant for expecting racial identities, attitudes, and beliefs to influence—sometimes positively and sometimes negatively, sometimes weakly and sometimes powerfully—a range of key outcomes in the labor market and in the housing market. This will be so if for no other reason than that individuals very definitely hold identities, stereotypes, competitive apprehensions, and differing policy views that are linked to a racial mapping of the social world. It is a sociological truism that human action is guided by the meanings that other individuals and situations take on. In the prismatic metropolis of Los Angeles, as in the rest of the nation, the meanings that individuals bring to or create in many social settings are likely to reflect a racialized element.

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Appendix

TABLE 3A.1 *Interviewer Ratings of Respondents' Behavior During Racial Attitudes Section by Race of Respondent*

	Whites	Blacks	Native-Born Asians	Foreign-Born Asians	Native-Born Latinos	Foreign-Born Latinos	Design-Based F	Total
Hesitate or pause								
No	62%	67%	74%	70%	69%	49%	5.73***	61
Yes	38	33	26	30	31	51		40
	(860)	(1116)	(130)	(926)	(195)	(789)		(4016)
Justify or qualify								
No	78	77	89	89	91	78	3.21*	80
Yes	22	23	11	11	9	22		20
	(859)	(1114)	(129)	(925)	(195)	(789)		(4011)
Discomfort								
No	84	89	85	94	86	87	2.10 ns	86
Yes	16	11	15	6	14	13		14
	(856)	(1114)	(129)	(925)	(195)	(787)		(4006)
Object								
No	94	97	96	90	91	82	12.24***	91
Yes	06	03	4	10	9	18		09
	(855)	(1115)	(129)	(925)	(195)	(788)		(4007)
Summary count of ratings								
None	51	55	56	59	56	36	2.65**	49
Yes to one item	26	26	35	29	31	34		29
Yes to two items	15	14	4	10	10	19		15
Yes to three items	7	4	4	3	2[a]	9		6
Yes to four items	1	1	<1[a]	1	2	1		1
	(863)	(1118)	(130)	(926)	(195)	(793)		(4025)

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
[a]Cell count less than five.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

TABLE 3A.2 *Percentage Summary of Race of Interviewer by Race of Respondent and Interviewer Ratings of Respondent Behavior by Race of Interviewer*

	Whites	Blacks	Asians	Latinos
Interviewer race				
White	71%	24%	14%	13%
Latino	6	12	6	74
Black	2	55	<1	2
Asian	21	10	80	11
	(863)	(1118)	(1056)	(988)

	Hesitate/ Pause	Justify/ Qualify	Show Discomfort	Object to Section
White respondents				
White interviewer	42%***	21%	16%	5%*
Nonwhite interviewer	26	23	17	10
	(859)	(858)	(855)	(854)
Black respondents				
Black interviewer	37	19	10	4
Nonblack interviewer	29	28	11	3
	(1115)	(1113)	(1113)	(1114)
Asian respondents				
Asian interviewer	24*	11	7	12
Non-Asian interviewer	52	12	9[a]	—
	(1052)	(1050)	(1050)	(1050)
Latino respondents				
Latino interviewer	52***	22***	13	18*
Non-Latino interviewer	29	10	14	8
	(983)	(983)	(981)	(982)

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
[a]Cell count less than five.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

TABLE 3A.3 *Percentage Summary of Interviewer Ratings of White Respondents' Behavior During the Racial Attitudes Section by Background Characteristics*

	Hesitate or Pause	Justify or Qualify	Show Discomfort	Object to Section
Sex				
Female	42%*	24%	21%**	8%
	(462)	(463)	(461)	(460)
Male	33	20	12	4
	(397)	(395)	(394)	(394)
Age				
Twenty-one–twenty-nine years	26*	21	15	4
	(138)	(137)	(137)	(137)
Thirty–thirty-nine years	33	14	12	4
	(204)	(205)	(204)	(204)
Forty–forty-nine years	41	24	18	7
	(187)	(187)	(185)	(184)
Fifty plus years	45	26	19	8
	(329)	(328)	(328)	(328)
Education				
< high school diploma	37	13	20	22**
	(61)	(61)	(61)	(61)
High school diploma	34	22	16	7
	(210)	(210)	(210)	(210)
Some college	36	19	13	3
	(294)	(295)	(293)	(293)
Bachelor's degree	40	23	20	8
	(206)	(204)	(203)	(202)
Postgraduate	44	31	20	3
	(88)	(88)	(88)	(88)
Family income				
< 20,000	35	27	11	4
	(195)	(195)	(195)	(195)
$20K to 39,000	41	23	17	2
	(220)	(220)	(219)	(219)
$40K to 59,000	34	16	14	3
	(164)	(164)	(162)	(161)
$60,000+	37	20	14	4
	(186)	(185)	(185)	(185)
Conservatism				
Liberal	43	26	16	7
	(253)	(252)	(251)	(250)
Moderate	32	17	17	6
	(313)	(314)	(313)	(313)
Conservative	39	22	17	5
	(290)	(289)	(288)	(288)

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$

TABLE 3A.4 *Percentage Summary of Interviewer Ratings of Black Respondents' Behavior During the Racial Attitudes Section by Background Characteristics*

	Hesitate or Pause	Justify or Qualify	Show Discomfort	Object to Section
Sex				
Female	39%**	19%	12%	3%
	(728)	(727)	(727)	(727)
Male	27	27	10	4
	(387)	(386)	(386)	(387)
Age				
Twenty-one–twenty-nine years	20*	24	6	3
	(230)	(229)	(229)	(229)
Thirty–thirty-nine years	40	25	14	2
	(307)	(307)	(307)	(307)
Forty–forty-nine years	33	28	10	4
	(222)	(221)	(221)	(221)
Fifty plus years	40	18	12	5
	(354)	(354)	(354)	(355)
Education				
< high school diploma	57*	16	30***	5
	(213)	(212)	(212)	(212)
High school diploma	30	16	12	3
	(367)	(367)	(367)	(368)
Some college	31	32	05	2
	(413)	(412)	(412)	(412)
Bachelor's degree	36	20	11	3
	(96)	(96)	(96)	(96)
Postgraduate	20	24	1	7
	(25)	(25)	(25)	(25)
Family income				
< $20,000	37	20	15*	3*
	(556)	(555)	(555)	(555)
$20,000 to 39,000	33	23	8	2
	(248)	(248)	(248)	(249)
$40,000 to 59,000	40	23	15	4
	(95)	(95)	(95)	(95)
$60,000+	26	35	3	<1[a]
	(83)	(83)	(83)	(83)
Conservatism				
Liberal	30	30	9	3
	(424)	(423)	(423)	(423)
Moderate	38	15	17	5
	(386)	(386)	(386)	(387)
Conservative	32	23	5	3
	(300)	(299)	(299)	(299)

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
[a]Cell count less than five.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

TABLE 3A.5 *Percentage Summary of Interviewer Ratings of Asian Respondents' Behavior During the Racial Attitudes Section by Background Characteristics*

	Hesitate or Pause	Justify or Qualify	Show Discomfort	Object to Section
Sex				
Female	25%	9%	11%**	10%
	(547)	(546)	(546)	(546)
Male	35	14	3	9
	(505)	(204)	(504)	(504)
Age				
Twenty-one to twenty-nine years	28	8	10	7
	(141)	(140)	(140)	(140)
Thirty to thirty-nine years	32	13	7	10
	(282)	(281)	(281)	(281)
Forty to forty-nine years	26	16	10	7
	(273)	(273)	(273)	(273)
Fifty plus years	32	9	4	12
	(354)	(354)	(354)	(354)
Education				
< high school diploma	25	8	8	19*
	(186)	(186)	(186)	(186
High school diploma	23	6	2	11
	(249)	(249)	(249)	(249)
Some college	19	7	4	10
	(207)	(207)	(207)	(207)
Bachelor's degree	39	14	10	6
	(309)	(308)	(308)	(308)
Postgraduate	41	24	11	4
	(99)	(98)	(98)	(98)
Family income				
<$20,000	25	13	6	9*
	(266)	(266)	(266)	(266)
$20,000 to 39,000	34	15	2	5
	(182)	(181)	(181)	(181)
$40,000 to 59,000	49	16	16	4
	(120)	(120)	(120)	(120)
$60,000+	25	6	10	2
	(149)	(148)	(148)	(148)
Conservatism				
Liberal	35	14	7	4***
	(257)	(256)	(256)	(256)
Moderate	28	11	8	16
	(394)	(393)	(393)	(393)
Conservative	26	9	7	5
	(374)	(374)	(374)	(374)

TABLE 3A.5 *Continued*

	Hesitate or Pause	Justify or Qualify	Show Discomfort	Object to Section
Ancestry				
Chinese	30	11	6	19***
	(524)	(522)	(522)	(522)
Japanese	35	12	16	3
	(165)	(165)	(165)	(165)
Korean	26	9	4	3
	(351)	(351)	(351)	(351)
Nativity				
Foreign-born	30	11	6	10*
	(923)	(922)	(922)	(922)
Native-born	25	11	15	4
	(129)	(128)	(128)	(128)

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

TABLE 3A.6 *Percentage Summary of Interviewer Ratings of Latino Respondents' Behavior During the Racial Attitudes Section by Background Characteristics*

	Hesitate or Pause	Justify or Qualify	Show Discomfort	Object to Section
Sex				
Female	49%	19%	12%	18%
	(512)	(513)	(512)	(512)
Male	43	18	14	14
	(471)	(470)	(469)	(470)
Age				
Twenty-one to twenty-nine years	42	15	11	14
	(362)	(362)	(362)	(362)
Thirty to thirty-nine years	45	24	15	18
	(305)	(305)	(303)	(304)
Forty to forty-nine years	44	14	15	16
	(163)	(163)	(163)	(163)
Fifty plus years	56	22	15	15
	(152)	(152)	(152)	(152)
Education				
< high school diploma	52	20	14	22**
	(567)	(568)	(567)	(567)
High school diploma	38	15	11	9
	(219)	(218)	(217)	(218)
Some college	44	20	13	9
	(132)	(132)	(132)	(132)
Bachelor's degree	32	21	17	15
	(52)	(52)	(52)	(52)
Postgraduate	43	16[a]	—	4[a]
	(13)	(13)	(13)	(13)
Family income				
<$20,000	56**	20	13	19*
	(503)	(502)	(501)	(502)
$20,000 to 39,000	37	19	9	9
	(251)	(252)	(251)	(251)
$40,000 to 59,000	47	18	15	12
	(70)	(70)	(70)	(70)
$60,000+	34	3	9	6[a]
	(44)	(44)	(44)	(44)
Conservatism				
Liberal	45	20	10	7***
	(262)	(262)	(262)	(262)
Moderate	48	21	16	27
	(426)	(426)	(424)	(425)
Conservative	43	14	12	7
	(288)	(288)	(288)	(288)

TABLE 3A.6 *Continued*

	Hesitate or Pause	Justify or Qualify	Show Discomfort	Object to Section
Ancestry				
Mexican	42*	18	12	13*
	(671)	(671)	(670)	(670)
Central American	59	21	16	24
	(238)	(238)	(237)	(238)
Other	49	22	13	15
	(73)	(73)	(73)	(73)
Nativity				
Foreign-born	51***	22***	13	18*
	(788)	(788)	(786)	(787)
Native-born	31	9	14	9
	(195)	(195)	(195)	(195)

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
[a]Cell count less than five.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

TABLE 3A.7 *Mean Summary of Independent Variables by Interviewer Race and Interviewer Observations for White Respondents*

	Common Fate Identity	Black Stereotype Difference Score	Asian Stereotype Difference Score	Latino Stereotype Difference Score	Black Group Threat	Asian Group Threat	Latino Group Threat	Affirmative Action for Blacks	Affirmative Action for Asians	Affirmative Action for Latinos
Interviewer race										
Same race	1.58	7.96	3.28	9.10	2.83	2.87	2.81	2.95	3.15	3.03
	(.08)	(.45)	(.38)	(.51)	(.11)	(.14)	(.09)	(.05)	(.07)	(.06)
Different race	1.47	7.39	2.82	7.93	2.80	2.65	2.94	2.90	2.99	2.92
	(.08)	(.58)	(.54)	(.46)	(.10)	(.12)	(.14)	(.07)	(.06)	(.07)
Hesitate or pause										
No	1.58	7.64	3.11	8.69	2.81	2.68*	2.90	2.95	3.11	3.00
	(.08)	(.42)	(.35)	(.43)	(.08)	(.12)	(.10)	(.05)	(.06)	(.05)
Yes	1.52	8.06	3.23	8.92	2.84	3.11	2.79	2.89	3.09	2.99
	(.09)	(.60)	(.51)	(.72)	(.15)	(.15)	(.12)	(.08)	(.08)	(.07)
Justify or qualify										
No	1.60	7.84	3.17	8.84	2.81	2.75	2.80	2.94	3.13	3.00
	(.07)	(.37)	(.33)	(.40)	(.09)	(.11)	(.08)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)
Yes	1.43	7.57	3.03	8.44	2.86	3.03	3.04	2.88	3.01	2.98
	(.11)	(.93)	(.60)	(.95)	(.17)	(.24)	(.16)	(.12)	(.13)	(.13)
Show discomfort										
No	1.56	8.08	3.33	9.11*	2.87	2.76	2.87	2.95	3.13	3.02
	(.07)	(.40)	(.33)	(.40)	(.09)	(.11)	(.08)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Yes	1.54	6.24	2.18	6.71	2.52	3.09	2.83	2.82	2.96	2.84
	(.11)	(1.09)	(.51)	(1.08)	(.15)	(.25)	(.18)	(.08)	(.09)	(.08)
Object to section										
No	1.56	7.23	3.14	8.76	2.82	2.80	2.87	2.90*	3.08	2.98
	(.07)	(.36)	(.31)	(.39)	(.08)	(.10)	(.08)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)
Yes	1.53	9.64	3.86	8.92	2.77	2.80	2.76	3.34	3.41	3.30
	(.20)	(2.63)	(1.54)	(2.69)	(.37)	(.58)	(.35)	(.22)	(.20)	(.21)

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
*$p < .05$

TABLE 3A.8 *Mean Summary of Independent Variables by Interviewer Race and Interviewer Observations for Black Respondents*

	Common Fate Identity	White Stereotype Difference Score	Asian Stereotype Difference Score	Latino Stereotype Difference Score	Asian Group Threat	Latino Group Threat	Affirmative Action for Blacks	Affirmative Action for Asians	Affirmative Action for Latinos
Interviewer race									
Same race	1.89	.11	4.00	5.56*	3.90***	3.60*	1.73*	2.57	2.14
	(.07)	(.47)	(.47)	(.36)	(.06)	(.10)	(.05)	(.06)	(.05)
Different race	2.04	−.24	3.93	3.49	2.90	2.90	1.97	2.64	2.09
	(.17)	(1.06)	(1.00)	(.79)	(.29)	(.28)	(.10)	(.15)	(.10)
Hesitate or pause									
No	1.90	−.71*	3.52	4.12*	3.40	3.13*	1.89	2.63	2.18
	(.12)	(.64)	(.66)	(.51)	(.23)	(.16)	(.07)	(.09)	(.07)
Yes	2.08	1.45	5.06	5.58	3.63	3.57	1.73	2.56	2.00
	(.12)	(.81)	(.62)	(.63)	(.11)	(.17)	(.06)	(.17)	(.08)
Justify or qualify									
No	1.85**	−.34	3.78	4.55	3.57	3.32	1.87	2.64	2.16*
	(.08)	(.58)	(.60)	(.47)	(.14)	(.17)	(.06)	(.08)	(.06)
Yes	2.30	.99	4.66	5.00	3.24	3.03	1.74	2.50	1.97
	(.16)	(1.29)	(.92)	(.74)	(.42)	(.17)	(.08)	(.10)	(.08)
Show discomfort									
No	1.93	−.21	3.96	4.60	3.47	3.24	1.86*	2.58	2.15*
	(.09)	(.56)	(.53)	(.42)	(.18)	(.13)	(.06)	(.07)	(.06)
Yes	2.17	2.02	4.22	5.19	3.54	3.58	1.64	2.80	1.90
	(.17)	(1.62)	(1.36)	(1.13)	(.20)	(.53)	(.08)	(.39)	(.10)
Object to section									
No	1.97*	.05*	4.04	4.68	3.47	3.27	1.84	2.61	2.12
	(.09)	(.54)	(.52)	(.42)	(.17)	(.14)	(.05)	(.08)	(.06)
Yes	1.59	−3.25	1.71	3.63	3.66	3.19	1.83	2.41	2.12
	(.17)	(1.44)	(1.71)	(1.11)	(.31)	(.23)	(.09)	(.15)	(.15)

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

TABLE 3A.9 *Mean Summary of Independent Variables by Interviewer Race and Interviewer Observations for Asian Respondents*

	Common Fate Identity	Black Stereotype Difference Score	White Stereotype Difference Score	Latino Stereotype Difference Score	Black Group Threat	Latino Group Threat	Affirmative Action for Blacks	Affirmative Action for Asians	Affirmative Action for Latinos
Interviewer race									
Same race	1.71	7.95**	1.37	10.12***	2.97	3.09	2.77	2.71	2.78
	(.10)	(.39)	(.54)	(.41)	(.11)	(.09)	(.07)	(.06)	(.06)
Different race	1.44	4.774	−.44	5.85	2.59	2.70	2.61	2.59	2.61
	(.22)	(1.19)	(.82)	(.88)	(.29)	(.26)	(.22)	(.20)	(.22)
Hesitate or pause									
No	1.73	7.89*	1.33	9.66**	2.91	3.04	2.76	2.68	2.77
	(.12)	(.55)	(.60)	(.53)	(.12)	(.11)	(.09)	(.08)	(.08)
Yes	1.47	5.36	−.07	7.51	2.89	2.89	2.66	2.70	2.69
	(.12)	(.90)	(.72)	(.65)	(.23)	(.10)	(.13)	(.10)	(.12)
Justify or qualify									
No	1.67	7.40*	.92	9.16	2.89	3.04*	2.75	2.71	2.77
	(.10)	(.54)	(.51)	(.51)	(.12)	(.11)	(.08)	(.07)	(.08)
Yes	1.51	4.81	.71	7.83	2.97	2.72	2.58	2.49	2.57
	(.24)	(1.14)	(1.18)	(.96)	(.08)	(.10)	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)
Show discomfort									
No	1.70*	7.30***	.92	9.19**	2.96	3.03**	2.75	2.69	2.75
	(.10)	(.52)	(.49)	(.47)	(.11)	(.10)	(.08)	(.07)	(.07)
Yes	1.07	4.25	.46	6.15	2.42	2.57	2.53	2.67	2.70
	(.29)	(.66)	(.81)	(1.04)	(.33)	(.14)	(.21)	(.08)	(.08)
Object to section									
No	1.67	7.19	.97**	9.06	2.91	3.01	2.72	2.67	2.73
	(.10)	(.52)	(.48)	(.48)	(.12)	(.11)	(.08)	(.07)	(.08)
Yes	1.56	5.64	−.93	8.15	2.79	2.98	2.88	2.85	2.89
	(.13)	(.63)	(.56)	(.43)	(.10)	(.12)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

TABLE 3A.10 *Mean Summary of Independent Variables by Interviewer Race and Interviewer Observations for Latino Respondents*

	Common Fate Identity	Black Stereotype Difference Score	Asian Stereotype Difference Score	White Stereotype Difference Score	Black Group Threat	Asian Group Threat	Affirmative Action for Blacks	Affirmative Action for Asians	Affirmative Action for Latinos
Interviewer race									
Same race	1.67**	4.75***	.06***	−3.31*	3.19	3.54***	2.43	2.54	2.11
	(.07)	(.39)	(.49)	(.55)	(.08)	(.07)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)
Different race	1.35	1.31	−2.99	−5.34	2.97	3.01	2.43	2.56	2.31
	(.10)	(.66)	(.61)	(.82)	(.13)	(.11)	(.08)	(.08)	(.09)
Hesitate or pause									
No	1.64	3.22**	−1.02	−4.23	3.14	3.35	2.38	2.58	2.20
	(.08)	(.43)	(.41)	(.46)	(.11)	(.10)	(.05)	(.06)	(.06)
Yes	1.54	4.60	−.41	−3.28	3.11	3.43	2.49	2.53	2.19
	(.08)	(.44)	(.60)	(.73)	(.09)	(.09)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)
Justify or qualify									
No	1.54	3.77	−.82	−4.19	3.16	3.36	2.44	2.54	2.22
	(.06)	(.39)	(.41)	(.46)	(.08)	(.08)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)
Yes	1.79	4.02	−.64	−2.35	2.98	3.57	2.37	2.60	2.07
	(.17)	(.58)	(.82)	(1.04)	(.17)	(.12)	(.06)	(.07)	(.10)
Show discomfort									
No	1.63	3.96	−.84	−3.75	3.14	3.43	2.44	2.55	2.20
	(.06)	(.37)	(.41)	(.49)	(.08)	(.07)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)
Yes	1.42	3.02	−.07	−4.18	2.96	3.17	2.41	2.58	2.19
	(.13)	(.69)	(.90)	(1.11)	(.15)	(.15)	(.07)	(.09)	(.08)
Object to section									
No	1.66**	3.93	−1.02	−4.12*	3.14	3.37	2.40**	2.53	2.15**
	(.06)	(.36)	(.41)	(.53)	(.08)	(.07)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)
Yes	1.23	3.35	.90	−1.95	3.07	3.47	2.63	2.66	2.42
	(.13)	(.81)	(.99)	(.92)	(.13)	(.13)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

TABLE 3A.11 *Frequencies for Independent Variables by Race*

	Whites	Blacks	Asians	Latinos	Total
Social background					
Education					
< high school diploma	5%	11%	15%	50%	20%
High school diploma	24	33	21	24	26
Some college	36	40	20	18	28
Bachelor's degree	26	9	32	7	18
Postgraduate	10	7	12	2	8
	(863)	(1117)	(1055)	(988)	(4023)
Gender					
Female	55	57	53	52	54
Male	45	43	47	48	46
	(863)	(1118)	(1056)	(988)	(4025)
Age					
Twenty-one to twenty-nine years	17	26	20	35	25
Thirty to thirty-nine years	25	28	23	29	26
Forty to forty-nine years	23	19	24	18	21
Fifty plus years	36	27	34	18	29
	(862)	(1117)	(1055)	(988)	(4022)
Income report					
Reported	91	87	74	86	84
Did not report	10	13	27	14	16
	(863)	(1118)	(1056)	(988)	(4025)
Income					
Less than 20,000	16	35	24	44	30
20,000 to 39,000	28	31	34	34	32
40,000 to 59,000	26	12	20	15	18
60,000+	(781)	(969)	(776)	(854)	(3380)
Asian ancestry					
Chinese	—	—	40	—	—
Japanese	—	—	20	—	—
Korean	—	—	38	—	—
Other Asian	—	—	3	—	—
			(1055)		
Latino ancestry					
Mexican	—	—	—	72	—
Central American	—	—	—	19	—
Other Latino	—	—	—	9	—
				(988)	
Nativity					
Foreign-born	16	8	89	74	47
U.S. native	84	92	12	26	53
	(863)	(1118)	(1056)	(988)	(4025)

TABLE 3A.11 *Continued*

	Whites	Blacks	Asians	Latinos	Total
Religion and social values					
Religion					
Protestant	38	70	29	11	38
Catholic	27	12	13	77	31
Jewish	13	<1	—	<1	3
Other	9	12	28	5	14
Agnostic or atheist	12	6	31	7	14
	(860)	(1116)	(1057)	(987)	(4020)
Political Ideology					
Liberal	31	43	33	26	34
Moderate or no thought	34	32	35	44	37
Conservative	35	25	32	30	30
	(861)	(1111)	(1039)	(985)	(3996)
Interview context					
Interviewer race					
Same as respondent	70	60	78	73	70
Not same race	30	40	22	27	30
	(863)	(1118)	(1056)	(988)	(4025)
Pause					
No pausing	62	66	69	54	63
Paused	38	34	31	46	37
	(861)	(1117)	(1056)	(979)	(4013)
Justify					
No justifying	78	78	88	81	81
Justified	22	23	12	19	19
	(859)	(1116)	(1055)	(985)	(4015)
Object					
Did not object	93	97	91	85	91
Objected	7	3	9	16	9
	(854)	(1116)	(1055)	(978)	(4003)
Discomfort					
No discomfort	83	90	93	86	89
Discomfort	17	10	7	14	12
	(854)	(1116)	(1055)	(978)	(4003)
Personal context					
Black friends					
None	93	29	99	97	78
At least one	7	72	2	3	23
	(863)	(1118)	(1056)	(988)	(4025)
White friends					
None	16	88	91	86	72
At least one	83	12	9	14	27
	(863)	(1118)	(1056)	(988)	(4025)

(Table continues on page 156.)

TABLE 3A.11 *Continued*

	Whites	Blacks	Asians	Latinos	Total
Asian friends					
None	94	96	57	99	86
At least one	6	4	43	2	14
	(863)	(1118)	(1056)	(988)	(4025)
Latino friends					
None	85	93	97	44	80
At least one	15	7	3	56	20
	(863)	(1118)	(1056)	(988)	(4025)
Workplace context					
White coworkers					
Other	35%	75%	85%	86%	72%
Mainly white	65	25	15	15	28
	(863)	(1118)	(1056)	(988)	(4025)
Black coworkers					
Other	99	67	98	98	89
Mainly black	2	33	2	2	11
	(863)	(1119)	(1056)	(988)	(4026)
Latino coworkers					
Other	92	90	91	37	78
Mainly Latino	9	11	9	63	23
	(863)	(1118)	(1056)	(988)	(4025)
Asian coworkers					
Other	97	98	58	98	87
Mainly Asian	3	3	42	2	13
	(863)	(1118)	(1056)	(988)	(4025)
Neighborhood context					
Tract racial composition					
<10 percent own race	2	34	19	3	15
10 to 19 percent own race	3	6	33	4	12
20+ percent own race	95	61	49	94	73
	(863)	(1118)	(1056)	(988)	(4025)
<10 percent Asian	62	74	19	56	52
10 to 19 percent Asian	26	19	33	34	28
20+ percent Asian	12	7	49	11	20
	(863)	(1119)	(1056)	(988)	(4026)
<10 percent black	92	34	92	85	74
10 to 19 percent black	6	6	6	3	6
20+ percent black	2	61	2	12	21
	(863)	(1118)	(1057)	(988)	(4026)
<10 percent Latino	28	10	15	3	13
10 to 19 percent Latino	22	20	17	4	16
20+ percent Latino	50	70	68	94	71
	(863)	(1118)	(1056)	(988)	(4025)

TABLE 3A.11 *Continued*

	Whites	Blacks	Asians	Latinos	Total
<10 percent white	2	52	14	34	27
10 to 19 percent white	3	5	12	18	10
20+ percent white	95	43	74	47	64
	(863)	(1118)	(1056)	(988)	(4025)

Source: Los Angeles Study of Urban Inequality 1994.

Notes

1. Each example is drawn from an article in the *Los Angeles Times*. In the order in which scenarios are mentioned, see Katz and Serrano 1991; McDonnell 1994; Dunn 1992; Maher 1995; and Silverstein 1996.
2. Once again, each example is drawn from an article in the *Los Angeles Times*. In the order in which scenarios are mentioned in the text, see Hong 1995, 1996a, 1996b; Hicks, Kwoh, and Acosta 1996; Lange 1995; Kang 1996a, 1996b; Mitchell 1996; and Renwick 1997.
3. Our results thus speak to three shortcomings of the vast body of research on racial attitudes. First, we are not constrained to examining only the views of whites. Second, we are not asking only about black-white relations. Third, through focus groups (Bobo et al. 1994, 1995) and instrument pretesting, we took seriously the obligation to treat the experiences of racial minority group members as generative for the types of questions we would pose. That is, the LASUI measures are thoroughly multiracial in ambit.
4. All multiple regression models are estimated using STATA, thereby adjusting for sample design characteristics.
5. In practice, affirmative action does not involve the use of "preferences in hiring and promotion" (Reskin 1998). Much of the media discussion and elite discourse surrounding affirmative action, however, does invoke precisely this sort of language, and thus we employed it in our questions as well.

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